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IRREPARABILITY IRREPARABLY DAMAGED
Doug Rendleman*
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE. By Douglas Lay-
cock New York: Oxford University Press. 1991. Pp. xiii, 356. $37.
Every lawyer who studies or participates in our curious enterprise
of constitutional government through courts should scrutinize Doug-
las Laycock's outstanding book, The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule. 1 For Laycock provides us with a means to understand and eval-
uate the way judges developed the most vital feature of our remedial
system - personal orders, injunctions in particular - and to predict,
with a fair degree of certainty, the course of their development. Lay-
cock tells the story by analyzing the decline and, he says, the fall of the
prerequisite to qualify for equitable relief: the claimant's demonstra-
tion that, absent equitable relief, she risks irreparable injury. I found
myself agreeing with Laycock's major theme, that demonstrating ir-
reparability has become otiose. Nevertheless, his method of assimilat-
ing personal orders into the remedial system by deemphasizing
important differences between personal orders and compensation
causes me discomfort.
We begin with a successful claimant who has proved that a wrong-
doer has breached the substantive law. The claimant is entitled to
something from the menu of remedies. The menu includes damages to
compensate the claimant's past loss, restitution to prevent the defend-
ant's unjust enrichment, punitive damages to punish the defendant,
and personal orders to protect the claimant by telling the defendant
either to unwind accomplished harm or not to cause future harm. In
our survey, the claimant's quest concentrates on personal orders and
alternatives. Before the judge enters a personal order telling the de-
* Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee Law School. J.D. 1968, Iowa; LL.M. 1970,
Michigan. - Ed. The reviewer thanks Gene Shreve for comments on an earlier draft.
This review is dedicated to the memory of the late Ed Yorio, a consummate professional, who
passed away at the age of 44 in January of 1992. I am sorry that Ed will not be around to
participate in the dialogue. See infra note 35.
Truth-In-Reviewing Disclosure Statement: I have known the author since the 1970s and
value him as a colleague. I read his work with interest and profit as it appears. I have been
involved with his anti-irreparable injury project in several ways. I read the earlier draft in 1987
and wrote him a detailed letter. I commented on the Harvard Law Review article at the Reme-
dies Section program in 1990; I believe the book responds to some of my remarks. See, e.g, pp.
14-15, 18-19. The book cites my work as defending the rule it delivers the eulogy for. See p. 4 &
p. 24 n.4; p. 6 & p. 25 n.7; p. 9 & p. 28 n.18; p. 213 & p. 224 n.l (citing Doug Rendleman, The
Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 346 (1981)).
I. Douglas Laycock is Alice McKean Young Regents Chair, University of Texas Law
School.
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fendant to alter conduct, he should be assured that the altered conduct
will benefit the claimant; if the defendant causes harm that is over and
done with, the judge should compensate the claimant with money
damages.
The judge selects a remedial solution and measures it. This inquiry
has three stages: (1) define substantive law goals and consult the
claimant's preferences, seeking a solution that advances both; (2) de-
termine whether remedial policies dictate augmenting or attenuating
the proposed solution; (3) measure, define, and coordinate parts of the
solution to assure that it covers the claimant's injury without over- or
underremedying and to assure that some parts do not duplicate or
overlap others.
Laycock's analysis focuses on the first two stages of the inquiry.
His study recasts these more precisely as follows: (1) beginning with
the claimant's preference for a personal remedy, the judge asks which
remedy - a personal order versus money, or sometimes a criminal
sanction - best serves the substantive policies? and (2) if the judge
selects a personal order, do any remedial policies militate against per-
sonal orders and lead him to disfavor that order? The irreparable in-
jury rule is, or was, a remedial policy that tells the judge to reject the
claimant's choice of an equitable remedy unless she establishes that
the remedy at law is inadequate or, in equivalent terms, that absent
equitable relief irreparable injury will occur.2
I. THE LAW-EQUITY DISTINCTION
The irreparable injury rule governs courts' choice between legal
and equitable remedies. Merger of law and equity is incomplete; in
most of our state systems, some parts of the field are considered per-
manently "equitable jurisdiction ' 3 where equitable attributes prevail
without any irreparability test. Traditionally equitable subjects in-
clude quiet title, partition, liens and mortgages, trusts, fiduciaries,
guardianship, dissolution of marriage, and adoption.
The irreparable injury prerequisite for equitable relief holds sway
where legal and equitable jurisdiction is concurrent and a claimant
may receive either a legal or an equitable remedy - for example in
contracts, torts, and copyright. The principal equitable remedies dis-
cussed below are injunctions and specific performance.4 The injunc-
2. The Supreme Court stated it as follows earlier this year: "[A] court should determine the
adequacy of a remedy in law before resorting to equitable relief. Under the ordinary convention,
the proper inquiry would be whether monetary damages provided an adequate remedy, and if
not, whether equitable relief would be appropriate." Franklin v. Gwinnett County, 112 S.Ct.
1028, 1038 (1992).
3. The text uses quotation marks once because "equity jurisdiction" is not jurisdictional in
the usual sense of defining a court's power to act. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS
OF EQurrY 301-06 (1950).
4. Other equitable remedies are constructive trusts, resulting trusts, equitable liens, subroga-
1643May 1992]
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tion is modem equity's premier remedy; it began in obscurity, dividing
business between two courts and protecting property, grew into bump-
tious adolescence as a tool for enterprise to wield against its employ-
ees, and achieved the present stage of its growth facilitating judges'
efforts to assure constitutional rights.5
A. Tenuousness
Although the irreparable injury rule is phrased as dividing the re-
medial world into legal and equitable spheres, the judge's functional
remedial choice is between a money substitute on the one hand and a
personal order, an injunction or specific performance, on the other. In
concurrent jurisdiction, the historical law-equity line follows the func-
tional money-conduct distinction, but only up to a point. Usually
legal relief is money and equitable relief is a personal order.
Carrying on the great legal realist tradition of Walter Wheeler
Cook,6 Laycock shows that courts have not maintained the law-equity
distinction at the remedial stage; the line is neither functional nor con-
gruent with the choice between money substitutes and personal orders.
Some relief classified as legal lets the winner enjoy the interest-in-fact
instead of a money substitute. For example, the nominally legal reme-
dies of ejectment and replevin are personal orders in practice because
they return the specific thing to its owner.7 While law takes in equity's
wash, equity takes in law's; equitable orders frequently include money
awards to compensate. Finally, some important remedies subsist in
both camps. Restitution wears both legal and equitable garb. Rescis-
sion of contracts occurs under both legal and equitable rubric. And
courts have referred to declaratory judgments as both legal and equita-
ble (pp. 14-15).
B. Consequences
Even though the distinction is difficult to achieve and perilous to
maintain, the characterization as either equitable or legal carries im-
portant consequences. Equity leads to judicial factfinding, personal
orders, and contempt enforcement; law leads to jury factfinding,
tion, accounting, and reformation. The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule does not address
legal and equitable restitution systematically even though that irreparability prerequisite is least
defensible. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF R.sTrTTON § 1.6 (1978). I will focus on the
all-purpose equitable remedies, injunctions and specific performance.
5. OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
6. See generally Walter W. Cook, The Powers of Courts ofEquity (pts. I & 2), 15 COLUM. L.
REv. 37, 106 (1915).
7. Pp. 13-14. Ejectment and replevin are also fugitives in the modem law curriculum; a
leading property casebook disclaims responsibility for them to "your course in civil procedure."
JESsE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 68 n.25 (2d ed. 1988). The modem proce-
dure teacher greets this tender with a blank stare of disbelief or hoots of derision. Many upper-
level courses in Remedies cover ejectment and replevin, however, and that may prevent future
generations of lawyers from ignoring these curricular orphans completely.
1644 [Vol. 90:1642
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money judgments, and impersonal collection.8 Even if historical labels
no longer serve a functional purpose, these "equitable" and "legal"
bundles will normally stay together. Factfinding by judges will pre-
cede personal orders and contempt enforcement. Juries will be em-
paneled for money judgments, which will be collected impersonally.
Judges will preside over trials when injunctions are likely because
policymakers in courts and legislatures will seek to avoid the spectacle
of juries handing judges injunctions to administer.9
In addition, the constitutional jury trial right and the need for a
standard external to the modern judiciary will "preserve" the jury in
legal actions "at common law" - in the main, money damage ac-
tions.10 Equitable-legal distinctions raise procedural complexities be-
cause of the constitutional right to a civil jury trial. In the federal
system and all but a few states, because of jury trial rights, a jury per-
forms the binding factfinding in legal actions, the judge in equitable.11
Judges administer the irreparable injury rule, with its preference for
legal remedies, to sort legal from equitable in ways that protect a liti-
gant's right to have legal actions heard by a jury. Although claimants
normally seek juries to augment damages, when either plaintiffs or de-
fendants characterize claims to secure or avoid a jury, Laycock main-
tains, judges are alert to interpret and administer the jury trial right in
ways that protect that right without undermining the claimant's ulti-
mate choice of the most appropriate legal or equitable remedy (pp.
213-17). Laycock might have treated the jury trial right more sympa-
thetically; although The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule discusses
the civil jury, it stresses the jury's mechanics and nuisance value more
than its important populistic role in a pluralistic society.12
8. P. 12. Laycock adds several refinements, among them that preliminary relief is available
in equity but not law. He may mean that preliminary money damage is not available in damage
actions at law; if not, he might have also mentioned legal preliminary relief, prejudgment attach-
ment, and replevin. Other differences that the legal-equitable characterization may affect include
attachment, prejudgment interest, attorney fees, appealability, and scope of review of facts on
appeal. KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES 245 (5th ed. 1992).
This review will focus on the consequences mentioned in the text.
9. In C & K Engg. Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 587 P.2d 1136 (Cal. 1978), Justice New-
man in dissent referred to "a basic policy concern; that is, the typically more continuing and
more personalized involvement of the trial judge in specific performance and injunctive decrees
than in mere judgments for damages." 587 P.2d at 1143 (Newman, J., dissenting). For a con-
trary view, see Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment" Some Bicentennial Reflections,
1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 33, 75.
10. Carrington, supra note 9, at 33, 74 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII).
11. In Texas and North Carolina, juries find the facts in equity. See, eg., DeSantis v. Wack-
enhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 676 n.1 (Tex. 1990), cert denied, Ill S. Ct. 755 (1991); Allan S.
Meade & Assocs., Inc. v. McGarry, 315 S.E.2d 69 (N.C. App. 1984) (anticipating a jury trial of
the equitable remedy of reformation).
12. Pp. 166, 213-17. Through our national history, the prevailing sorting mechanisms for
legal and equitable remedies have expressed the preference for civil juries. Until Congress re-
vised the judicial code in 1948, § 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 told the federal courts to avoid
"suits in equity.., in any case where a plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law."
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (repealed 1948). Section 16's first draft forbade
1645May 1992]
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C. No Remedial Paradise
Fulfillment of the remedial promise of the merger of law and eq-
uity has escaped us. Reformers argued at least as early as 1848 that
the judge should grant the winning claimant relief consistent with the
pleading and proof.13 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure repeated
in Rule 54(c) the mergermeisters' aspiration to give winning litigants
their just deserts: "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the [claimant] is entitled." 14 The Advisory Committee's notes rein-
forced the idea that "a judgment should give the relief to which a
party is entitled, regardless of whether it is legal or equitable or
both." 15 "Modem procedural reforms," our contracts restaters con-
sole us without clarifying, "have blurred the distinction between reme-
dies at law and equity." 16 Two generations after procedural merger,
the leading practice work observed: "Eventually it may well be that
courts will feel free to ask only: 'What remedy is best adapted to mak-
ing the plaintiff whole?' "17
We continue to project the golden age farther into the future be-
cause the civil jury trial right has embalmed the "ancient and irra-
tional intricacies" of eighteenth-century law and equity for future
generations.1 8 Lack of an adequate remedy at law remains an element
of the plaintiff's case for an injunction or specific performance. 19
Perhaps the golden age is dawning. Laycock examines the dis-
equity "suits... where remedy may be had at law." The limiting words "plain, adequate, and
complete" were added before "remedy" to circumscribe equity courts; the language was intended
to prevent litigants from resorting to equity to avoid jury trials. A supporter of the amendment,
Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania, said, "The trial by jury is considered as the birthright of every
American. It is a privilege they are fond of, and let me add, it is a privilege they will not part
with." WILFRED J. Rrz, REwarrING THE HISrORv OF: THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 144,
175-77 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990).
Modem litigants may pay a high price to claim their birthright. The constitutional test for
the jury trial right is an inflexible mechanism. Functional considerations have been laid to one
side, leading to historical doctrine that Professor Carrington referred to as a "dusty cobweb" and
a "large, intricate web of judge-made constitutional anachronism." Carrington, supra note 9, at
74. Farther down on the same page Carrington "embalmed" the webs. Id. at 74-75.
Stressing the word preserved in the Seventh Amendment, Professor McCoid found that even
the Supreme Court loses its anachronisms in the dust. It confuses its inquiry into premerger
custom by converting analysis of remedy into a separate question. It exacerbates this confusion
by equating preferences with fraudulent conveyances. John C. MeCoid II, Right to Jury Trial in
Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKER. L.J. 15, 19-28 (1991).
13. See THE FIRST REPORT OF THE (NEw YORK) COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND
PLEADING § 231, at 194-95 (1848), quoted in Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Com-
mon Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
909, 934 (1987).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(c). See also FED. R. CIv. P. 2.
15. FED. R. CIv. P. 54(c) advisory committee's note.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1979).
17. 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1043 (1987).
18. Carrington, supra note 9, at 74-75.
19. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 17, § 1256.
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putes in concurrent legal and equitable jurisdiction where the claimant
seeks an injunction or specific performance and there is a genuine
choice between compensation and a personal order. The words irrepa-
rable injury tell us that a formidable barrier confronts a plaintiff who
seeks an injunction. The reality differs. Under the cover of reciting
the irreparable injury rule, courts have changed it. "A legal remedy,"
Laycock says, "is adequate only if it is as complete, practical, and effi-
cient as the equitable remedy" (p. 22). Laycock's research demon-
strates that, in the main, claimants who need one may choose an
injunction or specific performance over money damages. Courts treat
the compensatory substitute as inadequate.
As well they should. For few of us answer yes to Pomeroy's ques-
tion: Should a judge stand idly by, watch a wrongdoer inflict harm,
and only later tell him to pay the victim?20 The sum of the words
irreparable and injury is less than the meaning of each separately.
Under Laycock's suggested approach, the claimant may select
damages or equitable relief, an injunction or specific performance.
The claimant's choice of remedy governs unless "countervailing inter-
ests outweigh the plaintiff's interest in the remedy he prefers" (p. 266).
This statement of the test appears to deemphasize the judge's role in
evaluating the substantive law and remedial policies. Apparently the
relevant reasons for a judge to deny injunctions and specific perform-
ance are to be raised as affirmative defenses and the defendant will
bear the burden of refuting the plaintiff's request for specific relief.
In the finest tradition of legal realism, Laycock analyzes the re-
ceived doctrine in light of what courts actually decide to determine
whether the stated rules are the operating rules.21 He begins by
stressing the necessity of articulating the real reasons for remedial
choices; he discovers that, while the irreparable injury rule created the
appearance of a principle of confinement on equity, in reality it failed
to serve that purpose (pp. 237-43). Statements of the irreparable in-
jury rule are more than mere linguistic antisynergy. The rule, Lay-
cock shows, covers up the way disputes are decided, allows the judge
to escape the constraint of stating reasons, lulls us into a false sense of
certainty where none exists, prevents us from formulating better rules,
and may deceive some poor literally minded chumps into doing the
wrong thing (pp. 237-43).
We assimilate, process, and assess new knowledge and information
in ways that constrain us to change preexisting beliefs as little as possi-
ble. The iron grip of obsolete ideas is a major theme of Laycock's
20. Paraphrased from 3 JOHN M. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS
ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1357, at 389 (1883), which Laycock
quotes on p. 3.
21. See Cook, supra note 6, at 106 ("examin[ing] a series of concrete cases and see[ing] ex-
actly what it is that the chancellor does and does not do").
1647May 1992]
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work.22 The mental habits developed by filtering the legal profession's
thinking through the dual system of law and equity interfered with the
creation of a functional system of remedies. But The Death of the Ir-
reparable Injury Rule may contribute to the development of a more
precise terminology. As the profession learns that the legal-equitable
distinction is not functional and no longer useful except for analyzing
the constitutional right to a civil jury, it may replace the more general
terms equitable jurisdiction and equitable remedy with the name of the
particular remedy - injunction or specific performance. Except for
the jury trial right, postmerger policymakers in legislatures and courts
might omit the megaclassifications, legal and equitable, and decide
questions like scope of review based on policies discrete to each sub-
ject. Characterization as legal or equitable, if necessary for one pur-
pose, need not carry over to others.23 The choice should be a practical
one for functional rather than historical reasons.
II. THE IIR's STATE OF INSTABILITY
Perhaps the irreparable injury rule has been operating in a reduced
sphere for some time, formally unrepudiated but awaiting reformula-
tion. The rule has statutory antecedents and previously had jurisdic-
tional attributes, but it may have been subject to the same form of
erosion as an obsolete common law substantive rule. Common law
courts rarely abandon doctrines outright; instead they chip away with
qualifications and exceptions until a new rule emerges - if they leave
anything of the former rule, it is as an exception.24 In 1976, Professor
Chayes, discussing the injunction's role in constitutional and particu-
larly structural litigation, observed: "It is perhaps too soon to reverse
the traditional maxim to read that money damages will be awarded
only when no suitable form of specific relief can be devised. But
surely, the old sense of equitable remedies as 'extraordinary' has
faded." 25
22. See, eg., pp. 277, 281.
23. See generally Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REV.
535 (1959).
24. See Moore v. McAllister, 141 A.2d 176, 179 (1958) (detailing the gradual demise of the
rule against the use of equitable remedies in real property disputes unless legal title had been
proved); Edward H. Rabin, The Law Favors the Vesting ofF states. Why?, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
467, 473 (1965).
25. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1292 (1976). Even then, however, the irreparable injury rule existed in a tenuous state of blissful
insouciance, a state that Professor Eisenberg later named "instability." See generally MELVIN A.
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988). The merger of law and equity had
obviated the need for a law-equity test between court systems. When legal rules are inconsistent
with other policies, scholars will develop that incongruity in the professional literature. Id. at 64.
Nearly a century before, Pomeroy pointed out that the irreparable injury rule was inconsistent
with an activist judiciary's remedial goal of preventing harm. P. 3 (quoting 3 POMEROY, supra
note 20, § 1357, at 389). Soon after Chayes wrote, Professor Fiss called on policymakers to
abolish the remedial hierarchy that subordinated the injunction to other remedies. Fiss, supra
1648 [Vol. 90:1642
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Change in legal doctrine occurs when judges exempt certain types
of activity from the established but unstable rule.26 Citizens ought to
enjoy constitutional rights in fact, not money substitutes; courts per-
force ceased analyzing constitutional rights under the irreparable in-
jury rule.27 Courts can effectuate constitutional rights only by
granting an injunction that seeks to assure that the citizen enjoys the
rights in fact. The federal injunction was the premier remedy courts
used during the civil rights era to specify and secure civil and constitu-
tional rights.28 The injunction's majestic role in the post-Brown era is,
to put it euphemistically, "in jeopardy. '29 I believe that constitutional
adjudication through injunctions will return. Although I hope to be
around when dawn breaks, I cannot perceive the prospect to be an
immediate one. Accordingly this review emphasizes the injunction's
perils more than its potential. Whether an exception to the irreparable
injury rule exists generally under statutes that define substantive rights
is less clear, but courts administering some statutory schemes neutral-
ize the rule by presuming the plaintiff's irreparable harm from the
defendant's violation.30
Legal rules inconsistent with society's understanding unravel be-
cause lawyers and judges cannot justify the results that those rules
seem to compel. The irreparable injury rule's words had not changed,
but courts had formulated and established new principles, in Eisen-
berg's words, "not only because they explain anomalous precedents in
a way that prior principles cannot, but also because they reflect appli-
cable social propositions in a way that prior principles do not."' 31 The
irreparable injury rule failed to reflect applicable norms, policies, and
experience appropriately. Because of the new principles, the rule no
longer meant what its words conveyed; it survived nominally aid with
reduced force.32 Just as someone who "could care less" really could
not care less, the words irreparable, injury, and inadequate became
transmogrified into idiom and lost their ordinary meaning in the pro-
fessional vernacular.
note 5, at 6. My inquiry into the state of what I called the inadequacy prerequisite found the
decisions departing from the professed rule without adequate statements of reasons. Rendleman,
supra note *.
26. EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 68.
27. See, eg., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). Other examples include Nester's Map
& Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 760 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); PHE, Inc. v. Dept. of
Justice, 743 F. Supp. 15, 26 (D.D.C. 1990); Robbins v. Budke, 739 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.N.M.
1990).
28. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 86-90.
29. Owen Fiss, A Tibute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 49, 50 (1991).
30. See, eg., Nester's Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 760 F. Supp. 36 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
31. EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 79-80.
32. Id. at 118.
1649May 1992]
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A. Special Handling? Specific Performance and Injunctions
Even though the monolithic irreparable injury rule no longer ex-
ists, courts have several reasons to single out injunctions for special
handling. Interlocutory relief through temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions follows attenuated, even ex parte, proce-
dure creating a greater than usual chance of error. Citizen participa-
tion in finding facts and applying the law is absent from the injunction
process because judges hear requests for injunctions. If the alternative
to an injunction is a criminal prosecution, the civil burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence is easier for the plaintiff than the
criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Tailoring relief
to the plaintiff's discrete needs creates real administrative and poten-
tial enforcement burdens. If violations are charged, the judge who
granted the injunction will usually preside over the contempt issue.
An injunction defendant charged with criminal contempt cannot ar-
gue as a defense that the injunction is substantially erroneous or even
that it is unconstitutional. For fair or for foul, the injunction process
concentrates power in the judge to find the facts, apply the law, formu-
late relief, and enforce the order.
The reader may find a discussion of specific performance, the other
major "equitable remedy," helpful here. A buyer's right to have the
property she bargained for is not a substantive right like a constitu-
tional right that courts think she must enjoy in fact. Nevertheless,
specific performance has become a routine remedy for breach of a sales
contract. The remedial policies that signal special handling for injunc-
tions are attenuated for specific performance. Two backup doctrines
obviate the injunction's hazards in granting and enforcing specific per-
formance. Equitable cleanup is a greatly reduced threat to the defend-
ants' jury trial right.33 Federal Rule 70 and state equivalent
appointive and vesting rules or statutes supplant harsh contempt rem-
edies.34 I join Laycock in arguing that courts ought to respect the
claimant's preference for specific performance.35
On this salutary and uncontroversial point, Laycock's research
turns up an anomaly. He examines reported decisions administering
the irreparable injury rule and discovers that courts usually let the
33. See Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261 (N.D. 1976) (postmerger application of
cleanup doctrine).
34. See FED. R. Civ. P. 70.
35. Professor Ed Yorio has argued, on the other hand, that the party seeking specific per-
formance ought to carry the burden. EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 2.5, at 41 (1989). His principal reasons to disfavor specific
performance emerged from difficulties of enforcement, and he emphasized the possibility of harsh
contempt sanctions. Id. § 3.2. Unlike Yorio, I prefer to subordinate specific performance's risks
to breaching parties to its benefits to claimants. I adjure to courts an approach that favors claim-
ant's desire for specific performance unless defendant develops considerations discrete to the
dispute that militate against a personal order.
1650 [V/ol. 90:1642
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plaintiffs choose personal orders in the teeth of the rule's language.
However, "the principal remnant of the irreparable injury rule" is an
inexplicable welter of decisions declining specific performance of
breached contracts to sell goods that appear to be fungible or difficult
to replace (pp. 100-01). Why do nonbreaching buyers seek specific
performance when they could spend a damage award to replace the
item instead? Why do judges decline to issue a routine specific per-
formance order that is easy to adjudicate and administer? Empirical
research might shed some light on this conundrum of remedies. I
speculate that, to the buyer who has pursued specific performance to
an appeal or to a reported trial court opinion, the dispute has achieved
a momentum of its own or the goods are subjectively not fungible.
The injunction, as summarized above, is not a routine remedy. In
my judgment, the injunction requires special handling through princi-
ples of containment because of its potential both to benefit claimants
and to overreach defendants. A question I asked myself about the
thesis of The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule is whether the prin-
ciples of containment must include the irreparable injury rule. Even if
we abandon the remedial hierarchy and the irreparable injury prereq-
uisite to injunctions, the idea that courts enjoin when money is inap-
propriate will survive. The idea that money will be an unsatisfactory
remedy for some injuries lies at the base of two complex bodies of
doctrine: interlocutory injunctions and contempt.
B. Interlocutory Relief
Interlocutory injunctive relief, with temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions, is founded on an intractable dilemma
that grows out of the determination that money will be an inadequate
remedy. The plaintiff requires a court order to control the defendant's
conduct right now because if the defendant violates or persists in vio-
lating the plaintiff's substantive interest, retrospective money damages
will be unsatisfactory. But the procedural process has not functioned
fully; entering an interlocutory order to protect the plaintiff's right
from "irreparable injury" entails an unusually high risk of judicial er-
ror. And an erroneous interlocutory injunction may inflict legally im-
proper harm on the defendant.
Courts have developed procedures and standards for interlocutory
injunctions. These attempt to accommodate the plaintiff's importu-
nate request for procedural haste to prevent irreparable injury to her-
self with procedural protections that reduce the risk of error and
prevent harm to the defendant. Laycock says that the irreparable in-
jury analysis retains vitality at the interlocutory stage; he suggests that
judges use the irreparable injury rule only to decide whether to issue
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interlocutory personal orders.3 6
C. The Contempt Doctrines
The contempt doctrines, particularly the coercive ones, are also
inextricably related to the idea that money is sometimes an inappropri-
ate solution. Once the judge grants an injunction, the system is com-
mitted to securing the defendant's obedience. Coercive contempt is an
elaborate mechanism to assure that the defendant's behavior will be
modified to let the claimant enjoy her rights in fact rather than a
money substitute.37 Coercive campaigns are fraught with potential for
overreaching. A single trial judge, who may be caught up emotionally
in the struggle, exercises the power to imprison (perhaps indefinitely)
without any of the checks that usually precede imprisonment.38 Lay-
cock's brief treatment of contempt's dangers (pp. 14-15, 18) does not
highlight coercive contempt's risks to individual liberty; one of the de-
cisions he cites, that of the contemnor who "claimed to have lost
$18,000 in cash while bird hunting," 39 is an archetype of coercion
careening out of control, in which a judge is led to confine, potentially
forever, someone who probably told an improbable truth but was
disbelieved. 4°
The collateral bar rule in criminal contempt is a conspicuous
merit-avoidance technique and another reason for caution before en-
joining. When enjoined and charged with criminal contempt for viola-
tion, a defendant is barred from arguing as a defense that the
injunction is incorrect under substantive law, or even that it is uncon-
stitutional. Based on the policy of punishing disrespect for the court,
the collateral bar rule means that a contemnor may be punished for
criminal contempt for conduct that is legal under substantive law, per-
haps even constitutionally protected.41 In contrast, a defendant who
had breached a criminal statute will be exonerated if the statute is
unconstitutional. But the collateral bar rule does not cross the pages
of The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule.
36. P. 241. OWEN M. FLss & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984) first called
for separate terminology for interlocutory and permanent injunctions and reserved the word
irreparable for interlocutory relief. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 1004-06.
38. Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally
Stubborn Contemnor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 190 (1991).
39. P. 33 n.58 (citing Drake v. National Bank of Commerce, 190 S.E. 302, 304 (Va. 1937)).
40. Fiss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 36, at 1092. For an example of the police mentality
misplaced in coercive contempt, consider a Michigan law student's reaction to a recalcitrant
depression-era contemnor who had been imprisoned for civil contempt following civil procedure:
"[lit is evident that the purposes of justice will be served best by keeping such persons as defend-
ant under lock and key. She may well spend her life in confinement, unless her attitude
changes." Recent Decision, Equity-Contempt-Duration of Imprisonment, 36 MICH. L. REv.
1016, 1018 (1938).
41. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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D. Equity and Romance
The mystique of equity and injunctions persists. The idea endures
that equity is separate, distinctive, and superior. One of the ways the
legal profession uses the word equity is to describe flexible and discre-
tionary decisionmaking, crafting discrete solutions for particular
problems when inflexible rules would create harsh results.42 The
warm and fuzzy connotations of individualized justice will continue to
influence the way we evaluate and discuss other parts of equity's
jurisdiction.
Professor Fiss has reminded us of another reason to single injunc-
tions out. Injunctions are crucial because they are "the primary rem-
edy in civil rights litigation." 43 Money is a uniquely unsuitable solvent
to dissolve Jim Crow. Judges may use injunctions to effect massive
changes in government bureaucracies, to halt constitutional depriva-
tions, and to ameliorate the status of social groups.44 While the neces-
sities of the 1990s may lead liberals to draw down our reserves of
patience as we await broad constitutional reform initiatives from the
federal judiciary, the evidence of the injunction's role as a tool of an
active judiciary is apparent, especially in education.4 5 However, The
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule's development of injunctions to
advance constitutional goals is cursory.46
I can conceive of two reasons to feel nostalgia for the irreparable
injury prerequisite for an injunction: a civil libertarian's trepidation
about procedural overreaching and a liberal's affection for the injunc-
tion's potential for constitutional reform. Laycock has convinced me
that neither is a realistic reason to retain the irreparable injury rule.
The irreparable injury rule failed to prevent concentration of state
power where power threatens individual rights; statutes, the Constitu-
tion, and judicial restraint have served the cause of individual liberty
not perfectly, but better. The argument for retaining the irreparable
injury rule as a safeguard for equitable flexibility, discretion, and dis-
pensation contends for a principle that reduces its champion. One un-
intended consequence of an idealistic quest for individualized
"equitable" justice may be to preserve the irreparable injury rule, a
nonfunctional barrier to granting the remedy best tailored to winning
litigants' needs. A better (but also ultimately unpersuasive) argument
may be advanced for using the irreparable injury rule to ration scarce
judicial resources, to preserve the injunctive process for important dis-
putes such as constitutional issues.
42. Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 20-22 (1905).
43. Ftss, supra note 5, at 86.
44. Id. at 86-95.
45. Id.
46. See p. 41. Laycock provides half a paragraph of text.
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E. Stricter Confinement Principles
After limning the irreparable injury rule's present state and pro-
posing an alternative approach, Laycock turns his attention to several
more precise principles that have grown in the shadow of the desiccat-
ing larger rule. Laycock hopes that these tests will develop from their
roots in the policies that inform the choice between specific relief and
alternatives. He develops the "countervailing interests" judges will
consider to determine when to decline personal relief. Your reviewer's
search for principles of containment continues.
1. Balancing Tests
Balancing plays a major role in the rules that will operate in Lay-
cock's post-irreparable injury rule world.47 If awarding the claimant a
personal order will create undue hardship, burden innocent nonpar-
ties, or create practical burdens to implement, then the judge should
ask whether these putative handicaps "outweigh the disadvantage to
the plaintiff of receiving only substitutionary relief" (pp. 268-69). Ad-
ditionally, balancing is central to Laycock's proposed replacement for
the irreparable injury rule, which lets the claimant choose between a
personal order and a money substitute unless the defendant shows that
a countervailing interest outweighs the claimant's interest in the per-
sonal order he prefers (p. 266).
How much will judges, lawyers, and litigants gain if the obsolete
irreparable injury test is scuttled in favor of ubiquitous balancing?
Judges may analyze disputes by identifying the interests that a deci-
sion one way or another will advance or retard by identifying the in-
terests, assigning values to the interests, comparing the quantum of
value on each side, and deciding which side prevails. Criticism of bal-
ancing tests focuses on their potential, while purporting to consider
both sides, to cloak subjective choices, and to submerge debate in
pseudo-mathematical jargon.48 Decisionmakers cannot assign objec-
tive "weights" to the values or interests a decision affects; they can,
however, decide which outcome they prefer, select the variables to
consider, and mold them to reach the previously selected preferred
result.
The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule uses balancing tests in
two general ways: first, to choose whether to enjoin or do nothing, as
whether to issue a preliminary injunction or not; and second, to decide
between an injunction and a different remedy, damages or a criminal
prosecution. Using the term balancing interchangeably to describe
these two different decisions erodes whatever meaning it had. In both,
47. If The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule were in database, I would use the SEARCH
key and count all the times the words balance, balancing, weigh, and outweigh are used.
48. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943
(1987).
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moreover, the claimant's substantive right and stated preference sup-
port an injunction, but a balancing test may deflate that substantive
right by converting it to just another factor to be weighed on one side
of the scales. Balancing may be an errant way to decide at the policy
stage whether to subordinate substantive interests and the claimant's
choice of a personal order to a remedial policy that militates against an
injunction. One alternative not mentioned in The Death of the Irrepa-
rable Injury Rule is that a thumb on the substantive side will nobble
the remedial policy's ability to tip the scales.
Observers have long criticized equitable decisiomaking as too
subjective, varying from chancellor to chancellor like the length of
their various feet.49 Perhaps, instead of assuming that judges can bal-
ance, we might develop ways of stating the process of decision to focus
judges' critical judgment on choice - on who wins and why. Rights,
principles, and structures defined externally may provide more gui-
dance for future decisionmakers. Evaluating remedial policy in light
of substantive rights and the claimant's choices will lead to difficult
decisions with winners and losers. "To be sure," Justice Harlan said,
"as with any rule of law which attempts to reconcile fundamentally
antagonistic social policies, there may be occasional instances of actual
injustice which will go unredressed, but we think that price a neces-
sary one to pay for the greater good."' 50 Balancing tests are less than
redoubtable principles for those who seek to circumscribe the hazards
of the injunction process. As Professor Aleinikoff reminded us, quot-
ing Cardozo, metaphors like balancing start "as devices to liberate
thought, [but] they end often by enslaving it.''51
2. Other Principles of Confinement
Several of Laycock's more precise tests are not stated as balancing
rules. The judge choosing between money awards and personal orders
ought to decline personal orders that will either: (1) force individual
employees to perform personal services or unnecessarily compel em-
ployers to accept services; (2) impose an unconstitutional prior re-
straint; (3) treat one creditor of an insolvent debtor better than other
similarly circumstanced creditors; (4) fail to defer to more appropriate
decisionmakers, undermining another. tribunal's or branch's orderly
business; (5) "inappropriately evade or override the more particular
provisions of other applicable law" (p. 271); or (6) coerce someone
through contempt to pay money unless the debt is for family support
or a statute authorizes coercion (pp. 269-74). I consider bringing these
principles of confinement together and organizing them around the
49. Fss & RENDLEMAN, supra note 36, at 104-08.
50. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576 (1959) (Harlan, J.).
51. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 1005 (quoting Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.)).
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core of more precise alternatives to the irreparable injury rule to be
one of the book's primary contributions.
F. The hIR and Debris
Judges, Laycock learned, have been talking about the irreparable
injury rule incessantly and using it to make all kinds of decisions.
Laycock mentions other reasons, good and bad, that judges have fur-
nished when citing the irreparable injury rule to decline relief. Like a
Michigan March thaw, Laycock's careful work exposes the debris; it
shows us - to continue the metaphor - how much trash needs to be
hauled off in May. If courts use the irreparable injury rule at all in
passing on final relief, they should first reserve it for disputes where
the plaintiff is entitled to some relief; within that sphere of cases, the
rule can help identify disputes where the plaintiff is entitled to dam-
ages, but, because irreparable injury is lacking, not an injunction. If,
however, the court finds the claimant is entitled to no final relief at all,
the irreparable injury rule is misplaced as an explanation.
For example, some claimants request injunctions that would be
premature because the defendant has neither injured the claimant nor
threatened unlawful conduct harmful to the claimant in the future.
Others would seek injunctions that arrive too late to do anything
about an injury the defendant has already caused. These requests fre-
quently inspire courts to say that the claimant lacks an irreparable
injury. This is true but both superfluous and deceptive. If the claim-
ant's claim is unripe or moot, she is not entitled to any remedy at all.
Introducing the irreparable injury rule adds nothing but confusion to
an already difficult inquiry (pp. 220-26). Ripeness and mootness are
not ways to choose between a legal and an equitable remedy - they
are reasons to decline all relief.
When the way a rule is expressed differs from the way it is admin-
istered, hapless attorneys and judges may read the rule literally and
naively think it means what it says. This probably occurs in law of-
fices and in negotiations; it undoubtedly does happen in trial and ap-
pellate courts (pp. 100-04).
Courts disguise hostility to the merits behind distorted conclusions
that the plaintiff lacked irreparable injury (pp. 196-99). "Hostility to
the merits" does not appear to be a rule against equitable relief (p.
238). This phrase ought not to mean that a judge declined relief and
used lack of irreparable injury as a cloak, improperly donned, to de-
cide against a plaintiff who is asserting sound theories to which the
judge is hostile.
Laycock wraps it up with an anti-Restatement comprising three
rules he does not commend, set in brackets to warn the unwary reader.
Judges, he argues first, should be allowed to enter prejudgment money
relief. He next proposes to abolish the doctrine that deprives a buyer
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of specific performance of a contract to buy fungible goods from a
solvent seller. Apparently the basic premise of a plaintiff's choice lets
the buyer choose either specific performance and the goods or a money
judgment with which to buy the identical goods from another (pp.
274-75). Finally, Laycock reprobates the rules that disfavor injunc-
tions to substitute for or to supplement criminal prosecutions on the
ground that they are largely superannuated.5 2
III. BALANCING HARDSHIPS
Two of the subjects discussed in the overenforcement chapter -
balancing the hardships or equities in land use allocations and per-
sonal relief in the employment relation - show how the irreparable
injury rule and the more precise tests operate today. Developing these
two doctrines, further than the chapter does, to include fear of "extor-
tionate" settlements will reveal the way a related principle of confine-
ment militates against an injunction in both. Another doctrine that
attenuates personal orders, dislike of protracted supervision, segues
into employment orders.
A. Land Use Balancing
A claimant may seek an injunction to unbalance settlement negoti-
ations with a wrongdoer and to achieve a larger amount of money. If
the judge concludes that the dispute is economic, he may prefer a neu-
trally set money award to a personal order that the claimant may ex-
change for disproportionate cash consideration. For example, suppose
that the defendant has built an elaborate stone fence along the prop-
erty line between him and his neighbor. Because of a surveyor's error,
the defendant's fence encroaches on several square feet of the neigh-
bor's property; while the neighbor's land is worth about $5, rebuilding
the defendant's fence will cost around $1000.
In the inevitable lawsuit, the neighbor seeks a mandatory injunc-
tion to force the defendant fence owner to remove the fence. The
fence owner unsuccessfully interposes the traditional first-line defenses
to an injunction: that equity declines to try title and that the remedies
at law, damage or ejectment, are adequate. There are no fact ques-
tions about title. Realty is unique, and the interest cannot be compen-
sated; ejectment also is unsatisfactory because the sheriff cannot or
will not remove the fence. The judge will enjoin temporary trespass,
52. A potential criminal defendant's right to criminal procedure - including a criminal jury
- comes under a bar verbally more precise than the irreparable injury rule: equity will not enjoin
a crime. With but one significant exception, Laycock argues, courts that enjoin crimes articulate
the importance of preventing violations and protecting the public interest. Reticence to enjoin
criminal activity, he asserts, is a variation on requiring irreparable injury and just as dead. Pp.
217-20. Your reviewer joins the mourners.
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repeated or continuing, to obviate the landowner's need to maintain
multiple damage actions.
Balancing the hardships is the defendant's second-line objection to
an injunction. An order to remove the fence will "cost" the defendant
$1000 but "benefit" the neighbor only $5. In addition, destruction
may be a "wasteful" way to employ resources. The judge will balance
the hardships when an injunction compelling a good faith tortfeasor to
remove an encroachment has a disparate effect; comparing the plain-
tiff's loss absent an injunction with the defendant's cost to obey an
injunction, the judge will ask whether it will cost the defendant a lot
more to obey an injunction than the plaintiff's benefit from the injunc-
tion. If the defendant's balancing-the-hardships defense succeeds, the
judge will allow the encroaching fence to remain in place, but the de-
fendant will compensate the landowner and receive either an easement
over or ownership of the encroached-upon property. The Death of the
Irreparable Injury Rule develops balancing the hardships up to this
point.
In addition to the wastefulness of reconstructing the fence, another
reason cautions against an injunction. If the judge grants an injunc-
tion, the neighbor may threaten to enforce it to coerce the defendant to
settle on her terms; her starting figure will be $999. In Zerr v. Heceta
Lodge Number 11,53 for example, the plaintiff, claiming pie-in-the-
sky damages, may have been seeking an opportunistic settlement. The
judge balanced the hardships and declined to enter an injunction that
would have unbalanced settlement negotiations. 54
But balancing the hardships to deny an injunction that may un-
fairly skew settlement negotiations is based in part on the premise that
the dispute is primarily economic. The policies that led to the irrepa-
rable injury rule have emerged in another guise. The staple classroom
questions emerge: Does balancing the equities balance the owner's
property right away? Does it undermine the owner's right to possess
land and to protect the land's physical integrity? Based on the premise
that real estate is an economic tool, does balancing the equities erode
the concept that each parcel of real estate is unique?55
B. The Example of Employment Discrimination
1. Reinstatement Balancing
Employees' remedies for violations of civil rights statutes present
similar remedial policy conflicts. Two important recent sex discrimi-
nation decisions have ordered plaintiffs' reinstatements, one with ten-
53. 523 P.2d 1018 (Or. 1974).
54. 523 P.2d at 1024.
55. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 7, at 800-11.
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ure at a university,5 6 and the second as a partner in an accounting
firm.57 The courts' remedial policy reasons consist of placing the
plaintiffs where the defendants' compliance would have, and assuring
the substantive law's integrity.5 8 In addition, the trial judge in Hop-
kins v. Price Waterhouse, the accounting firm litigation, registered
skepticism "whether monetary relief alone provides a sufficient deter-
rent against future discrimination for a group of highly-paid part-
ners"5 9 - one way to tell the defendants they cannot discriminate
even if they are willing to pay for it. When the accounting firm argued
against reinstatement because there was too much hostility to work
together effectively, the trial judge observed that a large business entity
"lacks the intimacy and interdependence of smaller partnerships." 6
The policies behind the irreparable injury rule and balancing the
hardships - that some disputes are economic and should end with
damages set by a neutral factfinder instead of with an exorbitant settle-
ment coerced in the shadow of an injunction - reemerge in adjudicat-
ing reinstatement orders. Judge Posner wrote a third recent
employment discrimination opinion in McKnight v. General Motors
Corp. 61 He inferred that the employee-plaintiff "want[ed] to be rein-
stated in order to induce GM to buy him out," and declared that "if
the employee desires reinstatement for strategic purposes, that is a
valid basis for denial." 62 Posner, noting that the plaintiff's replace-
ment position paid more than the one he lost, speculated that the
plaintiff might exchange a reinstatement order for valuable
consideration.63
Judge Posner's opinion in McKnight compares reinstatement with
money alternatives and discusses the remedial solution as a whole.
But policy reasons to reinstate the wrongfully discharged employee are
nowhere stated prominently.64 The McKnight decision takes up the
need to develop a remedy that will make the victim "whole" only to
ask whether, if Congress intended a whole and not a half loaf, the
judge may substitute money, called front pay, for reinstatement.65
56. Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337 (lst Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
1306 (1991).
57. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
58. See Hopkins 920 F.2d at 976.
59. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1211 (D.D.C.), affd., 920 F.2d 967
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
60. Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1210.
61. 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
62. 908 F.2d at 116.
63. 908 F.2d at 116.
64. Cf Hopkins, 920 F.2d at 976 ("Mo the fullest extent possible, Title VII authorizes
courts to put a victim of discrimination in the position that she or he would have been in but for
the unlawful discrimination").
65. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 116-17.
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The McKnight court instructed the trial judge on remand to examine
reinstatement and to decide, if reinstatement is denied, whether to
award "front pay" - that is, whether to compensate the plaintiff with
money set by a factfinder as an alternative to a large sum negotiated to
settle a reinstatement order.66
The question of when a court's statutory power to remedy employ-
ment discrimination will override reticence such as Judge Posner's will
apparently remain on the agenda.67 For it is part of the larger ques-
tion of when to subordinate the substantive law's policies to the reme-
dial system's. When a chary court declines to reinstate a civil rights
plaintiff because it anticipates a coerced settlement, it raises questions
perhaps more acute than the questions about balancing the hardships
in land use disputes. Does fear of a hard settlement balance the vic-
tim's civil rights away? Does it undermine the policy of overcoming
employment discrimination? Does declining to reinstate convert a
plaintiff's right to work free from discrimination into an economic in-
terest that money will meliorate? If we believe that employees have
the right to be free from discrimination, should the judges grant the
injunction and let the employee, if she chooses, negotiate from a posi-
tion of strength?
2. Administering Complex Relief
Another equitable practice emerges in selecting employment dis-
crimination remedies. If, after an injunction, the parties do not com-
promise remedial goals by settling for money, the judge will be
responsible for administering compliance. Judges who refuse to grant
personal relief despite finding a risk of irreparable injury may describe
complex enforcement as too impractical to administer or too difficult
to supervise (pp. 222-24). Judge Posner stated the antisupervision im-
pulse in McKnight when he remonstrated trial judges to try to avoid
supervising an "ongoing and possibly long-term relationship," almost
as an alternative reason to decline reinstatement. 68 He touched on the
judicial instinct to avoid supervising protracted acrimonious dealings
between parties to a poisoned relationship as bearing upon the trial
judge's discretionary decision to reinstate or not.
Meanwhile, back at the trial court in Hopkins, the plaintiff had
sought an injunction to "bar like discrimination in the future. '69 An-
tisupervision emerged there as well. The trial judge felt that enjoining
66. 908 F.2d at 117.
67. See Hopkins, 920 F.2d at 980.
68. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 115.
69. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216, affd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting Louisiana v.
United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965))).
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the defendant to adopt an antidiscrimination policy was too intrusive,
too activist, too much: it is
unreasonable to place the Court in a continuing monitoring role in re-
spect to the ill-defined area of sex stereotyping which the proof shows
may occur without intention and is difficult to asertain.... This is an
area of sex discrimination that must evolve through more than the expe-
rience of one obviously atypical case before affirmative injunctions that
can be fairly and evenly enforced can issue with any confidence.70
And so he was content to exhort: "Both male and female partners are
on notice to avoid" sex stereotyping. 71
Developing reinstatement and hardships-balancing one step farther
than does The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule discloses the rela-
tionship between the doctrines. Moreover, two doctrines that lead
courts to eschew injunctions - fear of coerced settlement and an-
tisupervision - may function alternatively, one based on the projec-
tion that the plaintiff will not enforce the order, the other that she will.
Each is easier to wield once a judge decides that the dispute is primar-
ily economic. The policies that undergird the irreparable injury rule
resurface at a later stage of analysis. Skeptics may inquire whether
placing the antisupervision impulse on the scales will undercut sub-
stantive interests and the claimant's preferences in the same way as
balancing the hardships because of fear of "extorted" settlements.
How the judicial preference to avoid supervision will affect deci-
sions depends upon the particular dispute, upon the strength of the
substantive standard, and upon the individual judge, the chancellor's
foot. Scholarship and decisions will, I hope, clarify some of the most
muddled doctrine in the advance sheets. For example, a judge rejected
a shopping center's request for a preliminary injunction to compel a
retail tenant to continue in business under a twenty-year lease: "CBL
has no chance of prevailing on the merits and getting a permanent
injunction because of the well-settled principle that equity will not or-
der the specific performance of a contract where doing so would re-
quire the continuous supervision of the court."' 72 So much for purists
who thought that not prevailing on the merits meant losing on the
substantive law, instead of being refused a remedy because of a reme-
dial policy.
C. Prior Restraint
In the chapter on "Avoiding Over Enforcement," Laycock makes
several important points about the prior restraint rules (pp. 164-68).
The irreparable injury rule does not come directly into play with prior
restraint; in fact, the plaintiff's noninjunctive damage or criminal rem-
70. Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1216.
71. 737 F. Supp. at 1216.
72. CBL & Assocs., Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807, 808-09 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
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edy is usually palpably inadequate. While prior restraint may be re-
lated to irreparable injury in perverse ways, the prior restraint rules
provide a freestanding reason to disfavor injunctions and select an-
other remedy instead. Following adversary procedure, courts issue in-
junctions against unprotected "speech" to suppress sexually explicit
movies and commercial disparagement, protect discovery material,
regulate securities and advertising, and stop copyright infringement.73
Laycock's explanatory statement that the "prior restraint rules limit
plaintiffs to less effective remedies because we fear over enforcement of
rules against tortious or criminal speech" (p. 165) assumes that the
defendant's conduct will breach a constitutional rule of substantive
law and that, because of the prior restraint rule, courts attempting to
vindicate the plaintiff's substantive interest will favor retrospective
damage judgments and criminal sanctions over injunctions that allow
plaintiffs to enjoy their rights in fact.
While not formally staking out a position in the prior restraint de-
bate, Laycock appears to support the doctrine. He uses prior restraint
as a synonym for injunction: "It is not the law that the plaintiff can
get a prior restraint only when no other remedy is as clear, practical,
and efficient as a prior restraint" (p. 165). The prior restraint doctrine
militates against an injunction that the plaintiff requests and that,
aside from the doctrine, the substantive law may support. Sometimes,
as the following example shows, judicial prejudice against an injunc-
tion is difficult to discern.
A male college student surreptitiously tapes an office conversation
with a new woman professor. He then mixes her distinctive voice on
the tape with other material to concoct a second tape that purports to
be one of her engaging in a sexual misadventure. Plans are developed
to play the hoax tape over the campus radio station. The professor
learns about the tape and seeks an interlocutory injunction to bar the
student from broadcasting or disseminating the tape and to force him
to turn it over to the court. The professor asserts, with support from
professionals' affidavits, that the tape is false and defamatory and that
playing it will undermine her relationships with her students and her
spouse, as well as devastate her personally.
Playing the tape would be defamatory, and the professor could re-
cover damages. Precedent under state constitutions, however, sup-
ports a judge who declines to enjoin the broadcast. "Defamation alone
is not a sufficient justification for restraining an individual's right to
73. See Ocasek v. Hegglund, 116 F.R.D. 154, 160 (D. Wyo. 1987) (excusing plaintiff from
establishing irreparable injury).
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speak freely."'74 Contrary authority is scarce and attenuated. 75 If the
defendant violates the substantive law and if the victim prefers an in-
junction now to damages later, what remedial policy might lead a
judge to say or assume that a damages judgment will be appropriate
but that an injunction will not? Prior restraint rules tell courts to de-
cline to enjoin because of a preference to let the misconduct happen
and let the victim pursue a civil damages judgment. The prior re-
straint doctrine may stand for the idea that, while this is misconduct
the state can regulate, attempts to enjoin it will cause other people in
the future not to engage in important conduct that the state cannot
regulate. So the judge will stand idly by and let the defendant injure
the plaintiff because otherwise some hypothetical future conduct may
not occur. Perhaps Cornford expressed the notion best: "The Princi-
ple of the Dangerous Precedent is that you should not do an admittedly
right action for fear you, or your equally timid successors, should not
have the courage to do right in some future case, which, ex hypothesi,
is essentially different, but superficially resembles the present one."'76
Why should courts subordinate the plaintiff's preference and the
substantive law? Four hazards of the injunction process are: interloc-
utory injunction procedure may be attenuated, even ex parte; the re-
quest for an injunction will be heard by a judge without a jury;
injunction breaches are tried, normally by the judge, as contempt; and
an injunction's incorrectness, even unconstitutionality, will not be a
defense to criminal contempt.
Constitutional decisions have curbed, but perhaps not eliminated,
ex parte procedures where expression may be enjoined.77 Nonjury tri-
als and contempt enforcement continue to distinguish injunctions
from damage actions In asserting that "D]ury trial rarely protects
speech in a republic" (p. 166), Laycock stresses the civil jury's vital
function of interpreting the public will to the courts less than I would.
But I focus on whether courts ought to retain the prior restraint doc-
trines as principles of containment to hinder promiscuous issuance of
injunctions if those doctrines would allow the campus radio station to
broadcast the defamatory hoax tape.78
74. Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. 1983). Willing v. Maz-
zocone, 393 A.2d 1155 (Pa. 1978), goes a little farther, assuming that, even if the defendant is
unable to pay a damage judgment, plaintiff will not receive an injunction; for "the economic
status of the individual asserting that right" cannot affect "the constitutional right to freely ex-
press one's opinion." 393 A.2d at 1158. See also Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666 (3d Cir.
1991), a careful and thorough decision holding that Pennsylvania law does not allow injunctions
against future libel.
75. See Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1203, 1208 (6th Cir. 1990).
76. FRANcIs M. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOGRAPHIA ACADEMICA: BEING A GUIDE FOR
THE YOUNG ACADEMIC POLITCIAN 23 (6th ed. 1964) (1908).
77. Carroll v. President & Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
78. If the tape had been played once privately and adjudicated to be defamatory, would the
prior restraint doctrines caution the judge to decline to enjoin? The answer may be no. See
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The analysis does not differ if the judge cites the prior restraint
doctrine to decline to enjoin on the ground that the authorities may
pursue criminal alternatives - "subsequent punishment or penalties."
Laycock adds that "[t]he policy base of the rules against prior restraint
is our commitment to freedom of speech and the traditional belief that
prior restraints are more dangerous to free speech than subsequent
penalties" (p. 165). The prior-subsequent distinction is questionable
because an injunction, a personalized minicriminal statute, is" just as
subsequent as the presumed alternative, a criminal statute. If common
words have common meaning, both are prior. An injunction is a piece
of paper with the defendant's name on it that forbids conduct. Like
the paper threat in the statute book, an injunction does not literally
prevent a crime; injunctions and criminal statutes do, however, struc-
ture the defendant's incentives by warning of a sanction, contempt, or
a criminal prosecution.
The prior-subsequent distinction assumes that the defendant will
obey the injunction. Bickel's well-known but overblown metaphor
posits: "A criminal statute chills, a prior restraint freezes."' 79 In mak-
ing the point that criminal punishment is inadequate, Laycock appears
to assume the defendant's compliance with an injunction: "Criminal
punishment neither undoes the harm nor compensates for it. It may
be good for revenge or deterrence, but it is not a remedy" (p. 166). A
criminal statute with a certain punishment - 100 years in solitary for
littering - also "freezes" expressive conduct that may be constitution-
ally protected and unconstitutionally regulated. 80
A criminal statute and an injunction are prior and intended to de-
ter; a criminal prosecution and a contempt prosecution are subsequent
and intended to punish. If we take prior restraint out of the refrigera-
tor and discuss what the words prior and restraint mean separately, we
learn quickly they do not mean much. Nor do we know what they
mean combined. While the Court has said the proponent confronts
the "heavy burden" or "heavy presumption" against a prior restraint,
"there remains no canonical formulation of the prior restraint
standard." 81
I prefer to dispense with the thought-stopping shibboleth prior re-
straint and to approach the matter like other injunction-noninjunction
decisions. The plaintiff seeks an injunction against conduct by the de-
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990); 898 F.2d at 1208-09 (Wellford,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 898 F.2d at 1209 (Hull, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 623 (1977) & app. (1981) (Special
Note On Remedies for Defamation Other Than Damages). But, given the mystical power of the
words prior restraint, prudence counsels against definitive prediction.
79. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
80. Frederick Schauer, Parsing the Pentagon Papers 3 (May 1991) (Joan Shorenstein Barone
Center Research Paper R-3).
81. Id. at 11 n.62.
1664 [Vol. 90:1642
HeinOnline  -- 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1664 1991-1992
Irreparability Irreparably Damaged
fendant that is expression-related and arguably constitutionally pro-
tected. Perhaps the court will find that the defendant's speech is
constitutionally protected and end its analysis. If not, substantive vio-
lation found, the court will proceed to remedy, looking first at the
policies of the substantive law scheme the defendant is charged with
violating. The judge will favor the plaintiff's choice of an injunction if
it advances the interests the substantive law protects. Questions here
will include predictive inquiries about how likely it is that the defend-
ant will violate the law again in the future and whether this breach will
cause the plaintiff harm.
Reallocating the existing "burden" or "presumption" against prior
restraints, however, the defendant may show that remedial policies
militate against an injunction. Reasons to disfavor injunctions against
expression-related conduct seemingly are a specialized version of the
reasons for the irreparable injury rule; we seek principles of contain-
ment because we fear undiscerning interlocutory procedure, lack of a
citizen jury to ward off government overreaching, a preponderance
burden of proof, and contempt maintained by the very judge who ad-
judicated liability, with the injunction insulated by the collateral bar
rule from substantive scrutiny. An important lesson of The Death of
the Irreparable Injury Rule is that we should examine principles of
containment directly instead of filtering them through distorting
cliches like prior restraint.
IV. ENDING THE IIR's REIGN
A. Reform
We can approach reform of the irreparable injury rule in several
ways. First, the rule may be constitutionally based: the judicial power
to choose between damages and injunctions in ways that subordinate
injunctions because of their adjudicative shortcuts and administrative
burdens may be an inherent part of Article III and equivalent state
judicial power that cannot be abrogated except by constitutional deci-
sions or constitutional amendment.8 2 The judicial erosion of the irrep-
arable injury rule, particularly by decisions that enjoin to protect
constitutional rights without considering alternatives, diminishes the
prospect that the irreparable injury rule is an inherent part of the judi-
cial power.
Second, the courts themselves may possess common law adjudica-
tory authority to develop and circumscribe a doctrine like the irrepa-
rable injury rule that structures a judge's choice between remedies.
The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule suggests that courts have
curbed the rule; it is itself part of the reform process (pp. 37-98).
82. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991). Professor Gene Shreve sug-
gested this to me.
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Through professional criticism, judicial exceptions, and attrition,
scholars and judges have diminished the irreparable injury rule to
nominal survival and prepared the way for the bold Professor Laycock
to write its epitaph. 3
Laycock is not persuaded that the courts' work described in the
prior paragraph completes the rule's demise. He suggests a third op-
tion: legislatures, including Congress, should enact statutes to negate
the irreparable injury rule (pp. 276-78). He commends to them a draft
statute that neutralizes the irreparable injury rule without codifying
the interests and specific rules.
Some questions about political practicality spring to mind. When
developing platforms and legislative agendas, what political parties, in-
terest groups, and lobbyists will rally to extirpate the irreparable in-
jury rule? What coalitions will form to support this worthy reform?
What constituent interest groups will emerge to petition, buttonhole,
and importune legislators to eradicate this pest? What members of
Congress and state legislatures will assign staff, sponsor bills, and
schedule hearings on this riveting topic? Which networks and news-
papers will cover these hearings?
"An important reason for court rulemaking," Professor Car-
rington, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, ob-
served, "is that complex technical issues of judicial practice cannot
sustain attention through the political process."84 Unless an outrage
causes public clamor, the status quo possesses monumental inertia.
The legislator's need to tax, spend, and secure reelection virtually as-
sure the legislative proposal's oblivion.
Amendment of procedural rules is a fourth possibility. I suggest
additions to Federal Rule 8 and state equivalent rules. The first sug-
gestion is a second paragraph in the rule on claims for relief:
A claimant requesting an injunction, specific performance, or any other
equitable relief or personal order need not allege or prove that the dam-
ages or other relief are inadequate or that irreparable injury will occur
without the order. The defending party may object to personal relief on
any ground that makes it less appropriate than another remedy.
For neatness and consistency, the second sentence might be added to
defenses.85 An additional affirmative defense would be "adequate
remedy at law, lack of irreparable injury."'8 6
Laycock specifically rejects procedural amendments to abolish the
irreparable injury rule. "[R]ules of civil procedure are not supposed to
change substantive law," he writes, "and I have little doubt that the
83. The phrase nominal survival comes from EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 118.
84. Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE W. 281, 282.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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[irreparable injury rule] is substantive" (p. 278). In addition, however,
to the subject's technicality, mentioned above, using a procedural
amendment to neutralize the irreparable injury rule would update
Federal Rule 2, which set a "civil action" as "one form of action."' 87
One of Laycock's reasons for choosing legislation - that courts
have treated remedies as substantive - may be less than dispositive.
He cites a state-versus-federal choice of law decision.88 He appears to
conclude that substance-procedure characterization made in the con-
text of deciding whether to select state or federal law carries over to
another context - namely, whether a subject is amenable to rules
amendment or statute. One substantive characterization does not
overcome the richness and complexity of procedural reform. This as-
sumption may yield to more particularized decisionmaking where
meaning and classification depend on the function and policy environ-
ment of each particular decision. A classification as substantive that is
animated by federalism principles may not compel a similar decision
where separation of powers policies inform the discussion.8 9
B. The Law and the Enterprise
Laycock has an invigorating intellect, for after he observes courts
using the irreparable injury rule incongruently, he assumes an air of
injured innocence and proceeds with assiduity to set the matter right.
The legal realist is the nemesis of a legal rule that was a ruse. The
words irreparable injury did not mean what they sounded like they
should mean. And by any standard of what those words meant, the
courts were not deciding disputes the way the rule told them to decide.
Finally, Laycock reorganizes the doctrine to comport with the trend of
decisions and to improve the way courts could administer the choice
of remedies.
It is, however, important for Laycock to say what is and is not The
Law.90 Laycock evidences his loyalty to the concept of Uppercase
Blackletter by ending The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule with a
tentative restatement, the rules offered in bold print (pp. 265-76). Lay-
cock looks out over a legal landscape where remedial rules are certain
and exist in texts.
Concluding that the legal process is not formulated so canonically,
those with more fluid and less fixed views about the enterprise of gov-
ernment through courts - as well as about the injunction's potential
peril and profit - will direct their attention to the wide potential
range of possible practical solutions to particular disputes. Viewing
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
88. Pp. 278 & 285 n.14 (citing Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330
(1988)).
89. See Carrington, supra note 84, at 284-85.
90. P. 260 (my uppercase).
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the study of remedies as not restricted to a "discrete normative do-
main distinguishable from the entire normative universe," 9' they will
call for additional remedial research on constitutional adjudication
and principles of containment as well as on the moral, economic, polit-
ical, and administrative values that inform judges' choices between al-
ternative remedies.
Judges create remedial solutions called rules and simultaneously
apply them to events that occurred before the rule was promulgated;
they may modify and supplant standards the litigants previously
thought applied. A precedent is a present signal to unknown future
disputants: this decision decides your dispute also. Remedies decisions
differ as precedent from substantive decisions. They provide scant ba-
sis for planning primary conduct; no one should rely on an earlier
remedial solution to violate the substantive law. 92 Remedies opinions
also have an uncanny tendency to approach and recede as precedents
under the pressure of the adversary technique leading to adjudication.
For difficult remedial decisions contain a justification or background, a
standard, and a discrete solution; a lawyer or judge may articulate
each as the opinion's "rule."
Because it illustrates the preceding discussion of our different ways
of looking at the law and the judicial enterprise in the context of legal
education, I will not resist one lapse from my repugnance at revisiting
the scenes of my youthful delinquencies. Laycock's discussion of
whether judges will enjoin a trespass includes a summary of Chancel-
lor Kent's artful 1823 decision, Jerome v. Ross.93 In the course of con-
cluding that Kent stumbled, Laycock observes that "[t]he opinion still
appears in a well-known casebook" (p. 39). As a coeditor of that
"well-known casebook,"'94 I feel constrained to, first of all, thank the
author for the adjective, but second to observe that I aspire for Note 1
following Jerome in the casebook to be even better known. For that
Note cites and quotes authorities to the effect that "modern" decisions
subscribe to another approach. 95
In a law school casebook the pedagogical value of a well-reasoned
but "incorrect" decision cannot, in my opinion, be gainsaid. Under-
standing Jerome's social and political environment against the cited
precedential matrix is worth the effort. Whether Chancellor Kent de-
cided Jerome correctly is less important today than whether he identi-
fied the issues and formulated the arguments correctly. The
chancellor's discussion of the damage measures (including punitive
91. Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REv. 455, 456 (1989) (review-
ing EISENBERG, supra note 25); EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 153.
92. See EISENBERG, supra note 25, at 110-11.
93. P. 39 (discussing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823)).
94. Fis & RENDLEMAN, supra note 36.
95. Id. at 76.
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damages) directs our attention to the alternatives to an injunction. In
one felicitous but long-winded sentence, alone worth the price of ad-
mission, Chancellor Kent reminded us that the lack of a jury and the
harshness of contempt militated against an injunction:
The objection to the injunction, in cases of private trespass, except under
very special circumstances, is, that it would be productive of public in-
convenience, by drawing cases of ordinary trespass within the cogni-
zance of equity, and by calling forth, upon all occasions, its power to
punish by attachment, fine and imprisonment, for a further commission
of trespass, instead of the more gentle common law remedy by action,
and the assessment of damages by a jury.96
CONCLUSION
The curious reader who turns to the copyright page of the first
printing of The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule will notice the
Library of Congress cataloging data on a sticker pasted over an earlier
set of data. Instead of scraping the sticker off and making a mess like I
did, read on. The call numbers below differ. The cataloguer who se-
lected the original numbers had taken a cue from the words death and
injury in the title. The original numbers would have located The
Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule on the Washington and Lee li-
brary shelf ignominiously tagging behind the Lawyers' Medical
Cyclopedia-Personal Injuries and Allied Specialties, a humbling loca-
tion for all of us who love equity and believe that what we do is impor-
tant. A correction Library of Congress sticker was prepared and
pasted over the old. The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule is now
ensconced next to Chafee, the equity giant of the first half of the
century.
A trip to the advance sheets was just as humbling as scraping off a
pasted-in Library of Congress sticker. A trial judge in a corporate
dispute, which should have been well-briefed, managed to get almost
everything backwards. 97 Here are the court's incorrect statements,
with countercitations to correct statements in The Death of the Irrepa-
rable Injury Rule: adequate remedy at law and irreparable harm are
distinct tests; 98 the inadequate remedy at law prerequisite for prelimi-
nary and permanent injunction is the same;99 "Injunctions are ex-
traordinary remedies that are generally not favored";e ° mandatory
injunctions are more disfavored "since they compel a person to act
rather than simply maintain the status quo," and the plaintiff must
96. Id. at 67 (quoting Jerome).
97. Justin Indus. v. Choctaw Sec., 747 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
98. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see pp. 8-9.
99. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see pp. 110-32.
100. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see p. 5 n.6 & p. 253.
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show a clear legal and factual entitlement. 101 Finally, the judge de-
cided against the claimant, because the substantive law did not sup-
port relief; but in describing the result he stated that the claimant
lacked irreparable harm and had an adequate remedy at law.10 2
This review began by commending The Death of the Irreparable
Injury Rule to the widest possible professional audience. Laycock's
carefully researched and clearly written statements of present doctrine
push back the frontiers of learning; they will, if they find their way
into the professional vernacular, improve students' and lawyers' un-
derstanding, judges' decisions, and the administration of justice.
In a preceding paragraph, I left The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule on the shelf next to Chafee, where it ought to be classified - but
not remain. Additional reasons to read and evaluate it clamor for at-
tention. Laycock's important contributions include demonstrating
that the legal-equitable vocabulary is remedially nonfunctional;
describing what courts actually decide under the irreparable injury
test; suggesting that the courts' approach be changed by putting on the
defendant the onus of opposing personal relief; shining the spotlight of
his research on silliness and redundancy; and organizing and formulat-
ing more precise principles of containment.
The irreparable injury rule deceived us into thinking that judges
were making discerning remedial choices; we can now turn our atten-
tion to more effective analysis of principles of confinement and ways,
when its time comes round again, to use the injunction as a vehicle for
social reform without endangering important libertarian values.
Policymakers must consider carefully the reforms Laycock advocates.
Finally, the injunction against Operation Rescue in Wichita hit the
front page just as I was rereading The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule to write this review.' 0 3 Wichita had it all. A divisive issue. Bi-
ble-quoting preachers. Protesters in the hundreds. Counterdemon-
strators. An injunction that wasn't working. An off-balance federal
judge. A reluctant federal executive. Does any of this sound familiar?
Then, while I was writing this review, Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic was argued before the Supreme Court. 1°4 Why is the
injunction, particularly the federal injunction, worth fighting for and
against? The question Bray raises is whether, under the theory that
blocking access to abortion clinics violates patients' right to travel, the
federal court possesses federal question jurisdiction under section 1985
to enjoin protesters? The clinic protesters prefer to face state criminal
101. 747 F. Supp. at 1220. But see pp. 242-43.
102. 747 F. Supp. at 1223. But see pp. 196-200.
103. See Women's Health Care Servs. v. Operation Rescue-Nati., 773 F. Supp. 258 (D. Kan.
1991).
104. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991) (granting writ of
certiorari).
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charges - with jury trials. The controversies reveal to me how the
injunction's expedited procedure, lack of a jury, and contempt enforce-
ment concentrate judicial power and create the need for principles of
containment to curb abuses and excesses. Chancellor Kent, where are
you when we need you?
Professor Laycock has developed his functional analysis of reme-
dies to the "operative rule .. that equitable relief is not extraordi-
nary" (p. 243). I put The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule down
believing that, despite all the contributions Laycock makes, he thinks
the injunction is just another remedy. Readers whose remedial topog-
raphy has higher peaks and deeper valleys than The Death of the Irrep-
arable Injury Rule's will examine it in vain for the injunction's unique
concentration of power with its dual potential for articulating public,
particularly constitutional, values and for threatening individual
liberties.




CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS. By David
H. Vernon, Louise Weinberg, William L. Reynolds, and William M.
Richman. New York: Matthew Bender & Co. 1990. Pp. xxiii, 753,
and problem appendix. $39.95.
Before I first taught federal courts, I wrote to the late Professor
Paul Bator. I posed different possibilities for arranging assignments
from his casebook and asked for his advice concerning which he
thought would work best. His reply was gracious if brief. "Don't
worry about your particular approach." Professor Bator said.
"Whatever you do, the material is too rich to spoil."
The same can be said for conflicts. One of the few common law
courses in the upper curriculum, it invites more attention to themes of
judicial lawmaking and process than courses after the first year usually
do. Moreover, the topics addressed in conflicts are as challenging in-
tellectually as a law teacher could want. They continually provide op-
portunities to question the "what" and "why" of law. Finally,
professors have a hook to use in teaching conflicts that is not always
available in highly conceptual courses. Conflicts problems inescapable
in practice are really no different from those in the classroom. In per-
haps no other law school course do spheres of intellectualism (dear to
the legal academy) and practical understanding (dear to lawyers and
judges) so overlap.
Since this makes conflicts too rich to spoil, any good casebook
should do, and there have long been many good ones on the market.
It is fair to ask whether we need another. Professors David Vernon,'
Louise Weinberg,2 William Reynolds, 3 and William Richman 4
thought so. This essay examines their book and agrees.
Part I discusses why conflicts, despite its allure, can be so frustrat-
ing to teach. Part II discusses features of the new casebook. It con-
cludes that, while the new book does not represent a dramatic
* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. A.B. 1965, Oklahoma; LL.B. 1968,
LL.M. 1975, Harvard. - Ed.
1. Allan D. Vestal Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
2. Andrews & Kurth Centennial Professor in Law and Fulbright & Jaworski Regents Re-
search Professor in Law, University of Texas.
3. Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
4. Professor of Law, University of Toledo.
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departure from its competitors, its assorted qualities add up to an at-
tractive package: materials that may help conflicts professors involve
and truly teach a higher proportion of their students.
I. SOME REASONS CONFLICTS IS A DIFFICULT COURSE To
TEACH
To understand why conflicts is hard to teach successfully, it may
be best to begin with a closer look at the core of the course: the
choice-of-law process. That process exists for cases in which the facts
suggest two or more different sources for governing law, and laws
from those sources seem to produce conflicting results.5 A full-bodied
approach to resolving conflicts emerged from American judicial deci-
sions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This traditional
approach entered a period of stagnation, followed by what has often
been called a revolution in conflicts doctrine.6
Torts and contracts cases provided the stage for most of the strug-
gle. The shape of dramatic change in American conflicts law was clear
in the early 1970s. Local litigants began to win application of forum
law by arguing that they were among those whom such law was
designed to protect. In other words, they demonstrated that the fo-
rum had a legitimate interest in having its own law applied to the con-
troversy. 7 These decisions were sensible. However, because they
rejected a good deal of traditional conflicts doctrine, the decisions
were revolutionary as well.
Traditional doctrine had usually been indifferent to the purposes of
laws or to particular needs of litigants. It rested instead upon an in-
creasingly unconvincing jurisprudence, a vested-rights formalism simi-
lar in its way to jurisdictional doctrine most often associated with
Pennoyer v. Neff. 8 Geographical inquiries dominated both fields. For
Pennoyer the question was whether service of process was completed
(as it had to be) in the forum state. Under traditional conflicts doc-
5. This essay uses the phrases conflict of laws and choice of laws interchangeably to describe
such issues. On the roots of the first term, see Donald T. Trautman, The Relation Between
American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1977, at
105, 105 n.2, and of the second, see David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REv. 173, 179 (1933).
6. Examples of the many descriptions of the modem movement and its effect on traditional
doctrine include David F. Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 131
R.C.A.D.I. 75 (1970), and Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. RaV. 772 (1983).
7. While sharp local interests precipitated the revolution, the idea of inquiring into the poli-
cies accounting for a rule of decision was not parochial in itself. It is not surprising, therefore,
that courts soon began to use interest (policy) analysis to choose foreign over local law. For
discussion of several of these cases, see Russell J. Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in the
Conflict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 493,
499-501 (1985).
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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trine, the choice of law was governed by such facts as the location of
physical injury or the place of contracting. For some time, courts had
mitigated the harshness of-traditional conflicts doctrine through differ-
ent fictions. Yet these fictions - distasteful in themselves - offered
unreliable protection. 9
Pennoyer's dominance ended when the Supreme Court began per-
mitting personal jurisdiction in forums where service of process could
not be completed. 10 The conflicts revolution came only a short time
later, when a significant number of courts decided that geographical
indicators such as place of physical injury or place of contracting
would not necessarily dictate the source of governing law.II As with
the modification of personal jurisdiction rules, changes in choice of
law doctrine reflected a shift from hard-and-fast rules to approaches
that were far-ranging, supple, and policy-based.
Old geographical indicators lost their preeminence, but they did
not disappear under modern theory. Courts retained them while ad-
ding others. New indicators in torts and contracts cases included
places where the parties were citizens, and where relationships mate-
rial to the controversy were centered.12 Working with more indica-
tors, courts began using a mode of analysis unthinkable under
traditional doctrine. They applied in the same case geographical in-
dicators pointing both toward and away from a source of governing
law.
For traditionalist courts, a single geographical indicator decided
the case. Under modern theory, however, a single indicator is but part
of a larger net of geographical indicators used to gather data - raw
facts from each case. No indicator is invariably significant. The same
one (for example, plaintiff's place of citizenship) might illuminate data
instrumental to decision in one case but not in the text.
The different role modern theory assigns to geographical indicators
reflects a more profound division between the two approaches. Little
of what we now think of as conflicts policy accompanied the tradi-
tional approach. Geographical indicators instead operated in a closed,
mechanical system characteristic of deus ex machina formalism. In
9. See Joseph Morse, Characterization: Shadow or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027,
1056-62 (1949); Monrad G. Paulson & Michael Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws,
56 COLUM. L. REv. 969, 970-71 (1956).
10. The pivotal case was International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a
description of this period in the history of personal jurisdiction, see GENE R. SHREVE & PETER
RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 38-50 (1989).
11. Two watershed decisions were Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954) (contracts),
and Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (torts).
12. For example, § 145(2) the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLiCr OF LAWS (1971) offers these indicators for torts cases in general: "(a) the place where the
injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered."
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contrast, modem theory exhibits a preference for policy-driven rather
than fact-driven results. The essence of the modem approach is that a
raw geographical fact weighs in the balance of a conflicts decision only
when it implicates an important choice-of-law policy.
Modernists take their policies from shared goals of the choice-of-
law process. Chief among these are the goals of giving rules of deci-
sion the effects intended by the sovereigns that created them and re-
specting the reasonable expectations of the parties. If one engages in
this process of data collection and evaluation- carefully, it becomes
clear in many cases that only one choice promotes goals of choice of
law, and the modem approach is relatively easy to justify. The ap-
proach is also useful for difficult cases, because it reveals the clash of
choice-of-law goals that produces difficulties, and it gives courts as
much to work with as possible in reaching a decision.
Some commentators have been more enthusiastic than others
about these developments. 13 Yet two points seem clear. First, few
would turn back the clock. Second, the revolution has made conflicts
- never an easy subject 14 - more complex, elusive, and downright
difficult. 15 Except in a handful of jurisdictions still using the old ap-
proach,16 results now turn on particular and highly variable features
of each case.
Appropriately, then, students in law school conflicts classes are
likely to spend much time carefully unraveling decisions and hy-
potheticals. This is case method teaching of a demanding sort. For
13. Compare Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Function and the Basis of Regulatory
Interests Under Functional Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance of Benefit and the Insignifi-
cance of Intention, 65 VA. L. REv. 1063 (1979); John Bernard Corr, Interest Analysis and Choice
of Law: The Dubious Dominance of Domicil, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 651; John Hart Ely, Choice of
Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); William
C. Powers, Jr., Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REv.
27 (1976) (each expressing apprehension) with Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis
and Its "New Critics, " 36 AM. J. CoMP. L. 681 (1988); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis as the
Preferred Approach to Choice of Law: A Response to Professor Brilmayer's "Foundational At-
tack, "46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483 (1985); David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for Perfec-
tion and the Frailties of Man, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 207 (1981) (each viewing modern developments
more favorably).
14. It was to Cardozo "one of the most baffling subjects of legal science." BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 67 (1928). Professor Max Rheinstein later
described the traditional approach as the "most difficult and most confused of all branches of the
law." Max Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 632, 655 (1962) (book
review).
15. By one stern assessment, "the antics ofjoyriding conflicts revolutionaries have done little
to improve the image of our discipline." Friedrich K. Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
509, 515 (1985).
16. At one time, it seemed that all remaining jurisdictions would fall into line. In two juris-
dictions, however, traditional conflicts doctrine recently exhibited surprising fife. Owen v. Owen,
444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989); Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986). For critiques
of Owen and Paul, respectively, see Charles M. Thatcher, Choice of Law in Multi-State Tort
Actions After Owen v. Owen: The Less Things Change.... 35 S.D. L. REv. 372 (1990); and
Jeffrey Jackson, No Place Like Home Public Policy and Prudent Practice in the Conflict of Laws,
90 W. VA. L. Rv. 1195 (1988).
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the approach to be successful, students must prepare, attend class, and
actively (or vicariously) participate. 17 This is also where difficulties in
conflicts teaching begin.
Up to a point, the difficulties encountered are typical of those
professors face in most second- and third-year courses. Law profes-
sors usually find it much harder to sustain the interest of students who
are beyond their first year of law school.18 For several reasons, how-
ever, the picture is more discouraging for conflicts.
While evidence of merely mediocre work in law school is never
heartening, it is little short of horrifying in a conflicts course. Modem
conflicts analysis is so demanding that a superficial "C" level under-
standing of conflicts is probably close to useless. Those in practice
must have a mastery of the conceptual techniques to avoid fouling up
even simple conflicts problems. The prospect of unleashing more "C"
conflicts students on society takes a lot of the pleasure out of teaching
the course.
Mastery of the subject is possible for most students only through
careful reading, hard thought, and repetition of difficult mental exer-
cises - effort disaffected second- and third-year students may be un-
willing to make. Conflicts students often display cynicism about the
class material and about the manner in which it is taught. That is,
they dismiss conflicts decisions as unprincipled instead of attempting
to understand subtle forces of conflicts policy and the common law
process, and they mistake as redundant the variations posed in
method-based conflicts teaching.19
Thus, conflicts students often slip through the course without re-
ally understanding the subject. Much of this would probably occur
even if conflicts received a pro rata share of the dwindling commit-
ment of upper-year students. Unfortunately, it may receive less. Be-
cause conflicts course work often involves the repetition of outwardly
similar mental exercises instead of the information crunching charac-
17. On the strategies and difficulties of case method teaching, see Lon L. Fuller, On Teaching
Law, 3 STAN. L. REv. 35 (1950); Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal
Education: Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1951).
18. Upperclass students are prone to "[c]ycles of extended periods of lethargy followed by
bouts of cramming. During the second and third years of law study, student effort declines and
disbelief in [the] value of the standard techniques and expectations of legal education increases."
TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS 17 (1979).
19. Some readers might wonder whether there is not a rather obvious solution to the prob-
lem: make the final examination for conflicts so difficult that only students who truly grasp the
subject will pass. The proposal has a certain appeal, but is unrealistic for most law schools today.
Many use guidelines for grade distribution. These discourage or eliminate discretion to enlarge
grade categories, particularly extreme categories like "F' or "D." As a more basic matter, such
low marks are in these times of grade inflation rarely given at all. A professor who gave a
conspicuously large number of low grades could expect enrollment for the course to plummet
thereafter. Good students would be among those frightened away.
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teristic of many other upper-curriculum courses,20 students may be
correct when they perceive that less work is required to achieve aca-
demic mediocrity in the former.
This unsentimental picture of conflicts teaching accepts as cold
truth that many students may start the course comfortable with the
prospect of doing the bare minimum, and that such meager effort is
likely to produce little conflicts learning. However, while some view
problems of this sort as nearly unsolvable,21 matters are not that bleak.
I have explained elsewhere why few law students are genuinely beyond
hope.22 Those arguments bear on concerns raised in this essay and can
be summarized as follows.
For most upper-year students, the fear and mystery of law school
are gone. They know they will graduate whether or not they push
themselves in their courses. But this does not mean that they clearly
will not work, only that they realize they have a choice. If they feel
poorly treated, or simply taken for granted, they may exercise their
independence in ways disagreeable to their professors and destructive
to their own learning opportunities.
The idea then - particularly for a course as difficult to teach as
conflicts - is to draw a greater proportion of students into the rich-
ness of the material. Conflicts may be too rich to spoil, but it does not
teach itself. To improve the odds in the sense of reaching more stu-
dents requires of conflicts professors an especially large amount of
hard work and dogged enthusiasm. We need every edge we can get.
The Vernon, Weinberg, Reynolds, and Richman casebook seems to
offer one.
20. There is no need to suggest that other courses are less challenging intellectually than
conflicts. The point is that many are much more likely than conflicts to require students con-
stantly to absorb new, relatively technical categories of material. The difference is evident, for
example, from a comparison of conflicts with a course on the Uniform Commercial Code. On
the latter, see Edward A. Laing, Book Review, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249 (1979) (reviewing DAVID
G. EPSTEIN & JAMES A. MARTn., BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - TEACHING MATER-
IALS (1977)); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, Book Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDuC. 433 (1986) (reviewing
JONATHAN A. EDDY & PETER WINSHIP, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS (1985)).
21. Resentment toward students who feel no obligation to work hard is widespread among
law professors and has led to a number of hostile portraits. See, ag., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW,
INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 73 (1979); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCA-
TION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 278 (1983); Anthony D'Amato, The De-
cline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 475
(1987).
22. Gene R. Shreve, History of Legal Education, 97 HARV. L. REV. 597, 604-05 (1983) (re-
viewing STEVENS, supra note 21); Gene R. Shreve, Book Review, 33 VAND. L. REV. 822, 825-33
(1980) (reviewing ALLEN, supra note 21); Gene R. Shreve, Book Review, 52 S. CAL. L. REV.
259, 265-68 (1978) (reviewing THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT S. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW
STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977)).
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II. FEATURES OF THE NEW CASEBOOK
The authors have previously done fine individual work.23 Two
combined on an important conflicts treatise.24 Now they demonstrate
their ability to assemble course materials in a way that both recognizes
the sophistication and vitality of their subject and supports conflicts
teachers in meeting the challenge we have been considering.
As one would expect from such a seasoned group of collaborators,
there is nothing indecisive in the design or content of their book. Top-
ics the authors choose to address, 25 they address thoroughly and quite
well, effectively combining cases, text, and problems. The fairly bold
tradeoffs found in this casebook may be most appealing to professors
who come to conflicts from federal courts and civil procedure back-
grounds. For example, the treatments of personal jurisdiction (also in
civil procedure) and federal/state conflict of laws (also in federal
courts) appear in all conflicts casebooks currently in use, but are
among the best here. On the other hand, professors coming to con-
flicts from an international law background may prefer a book giving
greater emphasis to that side of the subject.26 Or professors with an
interest in corporations, estate planning, or some other area may pre-
fer a book giving greater attention to these and other substantive
fields.27
For teachers such as myself who do not stray far beyond the core
of the subject, the book should be a delight. Undoubtedly all the au-
thors contributed to the portions of the book treating the choice-of-law
process; yet Louise Weinberg's influence seems particularly evident
here.28 Professor Weinberg recently chaired the conflict of laws sec-
tion of the Association of American Law Schools. With many others,
I have long admired her scholarship on choice of law itself, on choice
of law and the Constitution, and on related matters concerning the
intersection of state and federal law. Of those who have edited
23. Se ag., Louise Weinberg, Choice ofLaw and MinimalScrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440
(1982).
24. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1984). Another edited an earlier casebook. DAVID H. VERNON, CONFLICT OF LAWS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1982).
25. The book covers all of the basic topics of a conflicts course: domicile (ch. 2); jurisdiction
(ch. 3); choice of law (ch. 4); The Constitution and the choice of law (ch. 5); federal/state conflict
of laws (ch. 6); and judgments (ch. 75. These topics are presented in a manner that makes them
more or less interchangeable. This is important, for every conflicts professor has his or her own
idea concerning the order in which the topics should be taught.
26. Eg., WILLIS L.M. REESE, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (9th
ed. 1990); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1986).
27. See, ag., ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 1989); GARY J. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1991). True to form, the one substantive area the new
casebook does treat ("Domestic Relations," ch. 8) it addresses in commendable detail.
28. Professor Weinberg confirmed this in a letter to the author, dated November 25, 1991.
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casebooks, she ranks with Lea Brilmayer, 29 Russell Weintraub, 30
David Currie,31 Arthur von Mehren, and Donald Trautman3 2 in ex-
ploring the choice-of-law process from so many angles.
A source of student resistance to conflicts has been that many of
the cases most important in the evolution of modem doctrine dealt
with substantive issues now archaic (such as guest statutes, wrongful
death liability, and married women's contracts). The new casebook
confronts this problem by balancing formative with contemporary
cases. Thus, although it contains many hardy perennials from the
classical and revolutionary periods,3 3 it also pursues conflicts issues in
more contemporary settings.34
I am also very impressed with the commentary following the cases.
It is engaging, nicely written material that pushes students to think
about what they have read and supplies numerous ideas and sources
for further reading. All of this should be of real help in overcoming
the difficulties in drawing students into the course. So too will dia-
grams35 and abundant problems 36 found in the casebook. Students are
29. LEA BRILMAYER & JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES AND MATERIALS
(3d ed. 1990).
30. EUGENE F. SCOLES & RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1972).
31. ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES - COMMENTS - QUES-
TIONS (4th ed. 1987).
32. ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1965).
33. Among the former are Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala.
1892), reprinted at pp. 219-21, and Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), reprinted at pp. 225-
27. The latter include Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954), reprinted at p. 293; Babcock
v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), reprinted at pp. 309-12; Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395
P.2d 543 (Or. 1964), reprinted at pp. 321-26; and Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.
1976), reprinted at pp. 343-47.
34. For example, product liability and mass tort cases are quite important now. See, eg.,
Symposium, Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation Issues in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL.
L. REv. 35; Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Pre-
liminary Thoughts, 10 REv. LrrsG. 309 (1991). Among the cases from this area appearing in the
casebook are Edwardsville National Bank & Trust Co. v. Marion Laboratories, Inc., 808 F.2d
648 (7th Cir. 1987), reprinted at pp. 381-83 (product liability); Perkins v. Clark Equipment Co.,
823 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1987), reprinted at pp. 405-07 (product liability); and In re "Agent Or-
ange" Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), reprinted at pp. 565-76
(mass tort).
35. For example, a diagram at p. 307 separates strands of law, policy, and interest-generating
facts found in the famous case of Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803
(Ala. 1892) reprinted at pp. 219-21. Students should find this technique quite helpful. It is
reminiscent of some of the authors' earlier work. See eg., William Richman, Diagramming
Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding of Interest Analysis, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 317 (1982); RiCHMAN
& REYNOLDS, supra note 24, at 178-96.
36. The end of the book contains about 125 pages of short problems. They look good and are
perhaps more numerous than those found in any other casebook. It is wrong, however, for
professors to be left as much in the dark about these problems as their students. As their creator,
see p. vii, Professor Vernon must have in mind certain uses for and answers to the problems.
Perhaps he will eventually prepare a manual sharing that information with those who adopt his
book.
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likely to welcome periodic assignments from this problem set as a res-
pite from case method work.37
Scholarship on choice of law is full of controversy, and the litera-
ture (including some casebooks) can be quite doctrinaire. I was
pleased, then, to discover that this book did not attempt to foreclose
discussion in controversial areas.38 The same holds true for the later
portion of the book dealing with choice of law and the Constitution.
The book faced a great challenge here. "I think it difficult to point to
any field," wrote Justice Jackson, "in which the Court has more com-
pletely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding
standards of a legal character than in trying to determine what choice
of law is required by the Constitution. '39
The picture has not improved. During the past decade, numerous
commentators have dissected tangled Supreme Court opinions. The
new casebook lays open the possibilities. It focuses on the Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Clauses, traditional inspirations for regu-
lating choice of law.40 The book also considers how other parts of the
Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause, might apply to regulate
choice of law (pp. 448-59).
A new casebook offers a certain advantage for those teaching any
course for the first time, since the material should be fresh, complete,
and located in just one book with no supplement. This holds true for
the Vernon, Weinberg, Reynolds, and Richman casebook. With it,
37. While it is doubtful whether the problem method should be the primary teaching mode
for conflicts, it seems clear that students respond positively to problem intervals in case method
teaching - particularly upper-year students. For general discussion of the problem method, see
Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 654 (1984).
On the peculiar advantages of problem assignments in a conflicts course, see Gene R. Shreve,
Bringing the Educational Reforms of the Cramton Report into the Case Method Classroom -
Two Models 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 793, 802-06 (1981).
38. For example, the discussion that I take to be by Professor Weinberg of the "anti-modern.
ist" position (pp. 384-85) is informative and respectful, even though that position is at odds with
her own view. For the latter, see Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied:
Overhauling Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67 (1988).
39. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit - The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 16 (1945).
40. Kg., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 816-817 (1985). Views differ concerning the extent to
which these clauses warrant intervention into the choice-of-law process. Compare James R.
Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and Credit to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1299
(1987) (arguing for the development of extensive regulatory doctrine); Terry S. Kogan, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651
(1987) (same) with Gene R. Shreve, In Search of Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard - Reflec-
tions on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REv. 327 (1982) (arguing that the full
faith and credit and due process clauses should continue to play only a minor role); Gene R.
Shreve, Interest Analysis as Constitutional Law, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 51 (1987) (same).
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and with the fine reference materials41 and mind-stretching articles42
that exist for the subject, first-time conflicts professors should have the
help they need.
For experienced conflicts professors, the prospect of adopting this
book may carry an added complication. To break in a different
casebook costs valuable time and effort, and it usually causes the pro-
fessor a small but disagreeable amount of classroom fumbling. This is
why, as many disappointed publishers' representatives will attest, I
hate to change casebooks. For conflicts, I have used successive edi-
tions of the same book since 1975. It is a measure of my regard for the
Vernon, Weinberg, Reynolds, and Richman book that I switched to it
this past fall. This essay has sketched some of the reasons for that
decision. In short, this casebook is too attractive to pass up.
41. Standard texts include ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (4th
ed. 1986); RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 24; EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1982); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(2d ed. 1980). For an excellent recent survey, see P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 601 (1990).
42. Eg., Lea Brilmayer, Rights; Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989);
Michael Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes,
80 GEo. LJ. 1 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277
(1990); Joseph W. Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REv. 731 (1990); Sympo-
sium, New Directions in Choice of Law: Alternatives to Interest Analysis, 24 CORNELL INTL. L.J.
195 (1991); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo. L.J. 53 (1991).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS. By
Lea Brilmayer. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1991. Pp. xvi, 240.
$12.95.
According to Ecclesiastes, there is nothing new under the sun.'
Nowhere are these words more apt than in the field of conflicts of
laws. Each generation of conflicts scholars batters down the work of
its predecessors and builds in its place a new theoretical edifice, only to
have the next generation go to work mining the walls. When the walls
have tumbled down and the ground is plowed with salt, the attackers
begin building anew. And the ideas they use to build their new crea-
tion bear an uncanny resemblance to those that were demolished by
the previous generation. Little changes in this cycle except the pace of
destruction and rebuilding, which quickens with each succeeding gen-
eration. Progress is measured in original combinations of old ingredi-
ents, rather than in the discovery of truly novel ideas.
Conflict-of-law theory nevertheless has great practical importance,
especially in the United States, where fifty sovereign states and a hand-
ful of territories and districts compete with the federal government to
make differing and overlapping laws. The American legal system pro-
vides a natural laboratory for conflict-of-law theories and has always
forced Americans to take conflicts seriously. Other nations and con-
glomerations of nations - for example, the European Community and
the Commonwealth of Independent States - may soon have similar
problems to confront, as they bundle once-unitary legal systems into
newly created confederations.
Professor Lea Brilmayer's latest work, Conflict of Laws: Founda-
tions and Future Directions,2 contains an exposition and a critique of
recent conflict-of-law theories. It also advances a new theory, which
Brilmayer calls rights-based analysis. This new theory unsurprisingly
rejects most of the theoretical underpinnings of the currently fashiona-
ble conflicts theory, governmental interest analysis. Even less surpris-
ingly, the new theory brings back some of the elements of the previous
generation's conflicts theory, vested rights. This book, which in its
early chapters sets out the cyclical nature of conflicts of law, is thus
ironically a product of that cycle.
Chapter One describes and attacks the vested rights theory of
Joseph Beale, which culminated in the first Restatement of the Conflict
1. "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which
shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun." Ecclesiastes 1:9.
2. Lea Brilmayer is Nathan Baker Professor of Law, Yale University. Her previous works
include AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM (1986) and
JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989).
1682
HeinOnline  -- 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1682 1991-1992
Choices of Law and Remedy
of Laws in 1934 (p. 18). Vested rights requires a set of conflicts rules
external to the laws of individual states. Judges use these external
rules, found in the general common law, to answer choice-of-law ques-
tions.3 The courts adjudicate cases using the positive substantive law
of a particular state, but they choose that substantive law by reference
to general common law - a natural law concept.
Regardless of the similarities between some elements of
Brilmayer's rights-based analysis and Beale's vested rights theory,4
Brilmayer in no way advocates a return to the days of the first Restate-
ment. Conflicts scholars may agree on little else, but they stand united
in their antipathy toward vested rights. "We are all positivists now"
might be the motto of modern conflicts scholars, including Brilmayer,
who universally reject the natural law implications of vested rights.5
Brilmayer shows that the intellectual basis of vested rights vanished
with the disappearance of the belief in a general common law (pp. 35-
36).
Brilmayer's book begins in earnest in Chapter Two, where she de-
scribes and provides trenchant criticism of the conflicts theory cur-
rently in vogue - governmental interest analysis. Interest analysis,
first propounded by Brainerd Currie in the 1950s and 1960s, 6 has re-
ceived wide scholarly support because it meets two common criticisms
of the vested rights theory. First, interest analysis purports to find its
source of authority in the internal, positive law of the state, not in an
external, general common law that modern scholars find meaningless. 7
Second, interest analysis rejects the notion of jurisdiction-selecting
rules - that is, choice-of-law rules that select a particular state's sub-
stantive rules without reference to the content or underlying policies of
those rules (pp. 59-60). To interest analysts, law is a purposive activ-
ity, and choice of law makes no sense unless it takes into account the
3. For example, under the first Restatement, the law to be used in a dispute over contract
validity is the law of the place of contract formation. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 332 (1934). But if the offeree mails the acceptance, the place of formation depends on whether
the court applies the mailbox rule, which is not the law in every jurisdiction. How can the court
make this initial determination of the place of formation without already knowing which state's
contract laws should apply? Beale solved this dilemma by specifying that the court was to use
the "general" law of contracts to determine the place of formation, not the law of the forum or
any other state's law. Beale instructed the courts to follow the mailbox rule, which he considered
to be part of the general common law of contracts. Pp. 36-37.
4. For example, as the names of the two theories imply, both endow litigants with choice-of-
law rights, although the nature of these rights differs considerably. Moreover, both theories rely
on norms external to the state's positive law. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
5. Brilmayer lists only one modern scholar, Perry Dane, who offers even a partial defense of
vested rights theory. P. 194 n.10; see Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
6. P. 43. The reader can find much of Currie's work regarding interest analysis in BRAINERD
CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
7. "The problem [with vested rights theory] was not the particular rules themselves but the
'metaphysical apparatus of the method.'" P. 44 (citation omitted).
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policies and purposes behind the applicable state's law. 8 Interest anal-
ysis seeks to select the proper law by examining whether the applica-
tion of a state's law in a multistate case will further the policies of that
law (p. 46).
Brilmayer believes that interest analysis suffers from one of the
worst flaws of vested rights theory: the theory, as set out by Currie,
turns out in practice to be jurisdiction-selecting, even while its expo-
nents maintain that it is sensitive to the purposes of the laws it selects.
Vested rights and interest analysis, she asserts, differ only in the type
of contacts they consider relevant to choice of law decisions. Vested
rights theory looks at territorial factors (for example, the place of in-
jury in tort actions), while interest analysis looks at the domiciles of
the parties (pp. 57-61).
Brilmayer arrives at this conclusion by analyzing a series of hypo-
thetical multistate cases under Currie's theory (pp. 56-60). Currie di-
vides all conflicts cases into one of three categories: false conflicts,
true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases (p. 47). Brilmayer points out
that Currie's false conflict cases usually occur when the two parties
share the same domicile (p. 58). In these cases, the court simply
chooses the law of the common domicile. True conflicts occur when
the parties have different domiciles and the two states have conflicting
laws (p. 58). Currie's solution is to apply the law of the forum. Un-
provided-for cases occur when the parties have different domiciles,
and neither state has an interest in applying its law (p. 59). Currie's
solution is again to apply the law of the forum. Brilmayer points out
that the domiciles of the parties alone supply the correct choice of law.
The court need not actually look at the policies or interests behind the
laws. Thus, Currie's theory is jurisdiction-selecting. 9
Brilmayer's analysis contains valid criticism of Currie's theory.
Thirty years have passed since Currie presented the theory, however,
and other scholars have continued to refine it. Her criticisms of Currie
do little to weaken the analysis of these later scholars. For example,
Professor Larry Kramer asserts that Currie was wrong in hypothesiz-
ing the unprovided-for case; Kramer maintains that no such category
actually exists. 10 He asserts that most of Currie's supposedly unpro-
vided-for cases are actually either true or false conflicts." Under
8. "The courts simply will not remain always oblivious to the true operation of a [vested
rights] system that, though speaking the language of metaphysics, strikes down the legitimate
application of the policy of a state .... " CURRIE, supra note 6, at 181.
9. Pp. 59-60. Brilmayer offers two qualifications to her charge that Currie's theory is juris-
diction-selecting: territorially triggered interests and the interest in interstate restraint might
cause the forum to look at state policies. P. 61. But she considers these considerations "anoma-
lous" to Currie's method.
10. Larry Kramer, The Myth of the "Unprovided-for" Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045 (1989).
11. According to Kramer, in the rare case where there really is no state that has an interest
in applying its laws, the plaintiff simply has no cause of action. Kramer considers this situation
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Kramer's analysis, interest analysis is no longer jurisdiction-selecting.
To decide whether the cases that Currie thought fell into the unpro-
vided-for category are true or false conflicts, the analyst must examine
the policies behind the laws of the two states. Knowledge of the domi-
ciles of the parties is no longer sufficient to choose the correct law.
Brilmayer also criticizes Currie's theory because of its short-
sighted view of state interests (p. 71). Currie intended to create a the-
ory allowing a state to pursue its own interests in its choice-of-law
policies, just as that state does in applying its substantive law. Thus,
Currie's solution to a true conflict - a case in which both the forum
and another state have an interest in applying their own laws - is to
apply forum law (p. 47). Currie believed that each state furthers its
own interests by applying forum law. This solution, however, fails
even on its own terms. If Michigan courts ruthlessly apply Michigan
law in every multistate case in which its laws conflict with the laws of
other states, Michigan can expect no cooperation from Ohio when
Ohio litigates a multistate case with important Michigan connections.
Brilmayer points out that Michigan may sometimes pursue its long-
term interests more effectively by deferring occasionally to the inter-
ests of other states. By deferring, Michigan can expect reciprocity
from other states in cases litigated in the courts of other states (p. 71).
Thus, a state's interest in cooperation is often as substantial as its in-
terest in applying its own laws.
Chapters Four and Five provide Brilmayer's response to her criti-
cisms of interest analysis. In Chapter Four, she offers her thoughts on
improving interest analysis. She discusses various game theory models
of cooperation that would induce a state to defer to foreign law (pp.
155-60). In the end, Brilmayer comes to the unhappy conclusion that
the enlightened self-interest of the state courts is unlikely to generate
sufficient cooperation to further each state's interests optimally (p.
163). She believes that an outside group will have to create a structure
of cooperation that each state can adopt (pp. 181-84). Her favored
choice is a uniform act adopted by all states, preferably a new restate-
ment from the American Law Institute (pp. 185-89).
Brilmayer seems less than optimistic that her solutions will solve
the problems of interest analysis. 12 Chapter Five, in which she sets out
a new theory of rights-based analysis, shows why. Brilmayer's heart
simply isn't in improving interest analysis. Even if scholars correct the
shortcomings of interest analysis discussed above - the shortsighted
view of state interests and the jurisdiction-selecting nature of the anal-
to be equivalent to a purely domestic case in which the plaintiff fails to establish a cause of action.
He sees no reason to invent an exotic name for this unsurprising occurrence. Id. at 1063-64.
12. For example, she only discusses her proposed improvements to interest analysis after
suspending some of her strongest reservations about the theory. P. 145.
1685May 19921
HeinOnline  -- 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1685 1991-1992
Michigan Law Review
ysis - Brilmayer believes interest analysis is incapable of taking into
account considerations necessary to a just choice of law system.
The facts of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague1 3 illustrate the flaws
Brilmayer sees in interest analysis. Hague was a wrongful death suit
brought in a Minnesota court by the widow of a man who was killed in
a motorcycle accident. The accident occurred in Wisconsin, and both
the plaintiff's decedent and the defendant were residents of Wisconsin.
The Minnesota trial court applied pro-plaintiff Minnesota law, rather
than the more restrictive Wisconsin law, even though the plaintiff
could point to only one relevant connection with Minnesota: she had
moved to Minnesota after the accident.14
Under interest analysis, the court's choice of Minnesota law was
perfectly proper. The plaintiff was a resident of Minnesota, and Min-
nesota tort law sought to protect Minnesota plaintiffs. Thus, Minne-
sota had an interest in applying its law. That the plaintiff became a
Minnesota resident only after the accident is irrelevant to the
analysis.15
The reader who is something other than an interest analyst will
probably find something intuitively wrong with this result. Why
should Minnesota be able to impose its law on a defendant with such a
tenuous connection to the state? Interest analysts may respond that
the court was indeed wrong; if the court had a clearer idea of Minne-
sota's true interests, it would defer to Wisconsin, so that Wisconsin
would reciprocate in cases that implicated important Minnesota inter-
ests. But Brilmayer would claim that this response does not meet our
real objection. The court was not wrong because it misunderstood
Minnesota's true interests; it was wrong because subjecting the defend-
ant to Minnesota law was unfair (p. 198).
This intuition is the basis of Brilmayer's fundamental criticism of
interest analysis. The theory is inadequate because unfairness is sim-
ply not in its vocabulary. According to Brilmayer, interest analysis is
consequentialist: if applying a law would further its values, the state
has an interest in its application.1 6 As Brilmayer points out, "the
problem with consequentialist reasoning is that it is indifferent to what
the parties deserve" (p. 202).
The deficiencies of interest analysis lead Brilmayer to rights-based
13. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Brilmayer sets out a hypothetical with facts similar to Hague on
page 197.
14. 449 U.S. at 305-06.
15. Currie himself rejected applying local law in cases of after-acquired domicile. See p. 197.
He therefore would have disagreed with the result in Hague. Brilmayer correctly points out,
however, that Currie was unable to justify his rejection in terms of interest analysis; he found the
need to explain his rejection in terms of vested rights. P. 197 n.23.
16. P. 200. For example, one of the values of state tort law is compensation of state residents
who are victims of torts. The Minnesota court could thus properly find an interest applying
Minnesota law to the plaintiff in Hague by virtue of her Minnesota residence alone.
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analysis. Brilmayer wishes to endow litigants with choice-of-law
rights that "arise out of the fact that the state's legitimate authority is
finite.. ." (p. 206). These are negative rights; they grant a party the
right to be let alone (p. 195). Her theory is not consequentialist; she
looks not to the consequences of her theory on the furtherance of state
policies, but to the fairness of a state's applying its law to an individ-
ual. Brilmayer's rights-based analysis thus reverses the concerns of
interest analysis: rights-based analysis focuses on the party who suf-
fers the burdens of the law, not on the party who enjoys its benefits (p.
213).
Brilmayer uses these principles to derive several bases for legiti-
mate state coercion of a party who is disadvantaged by the application
of local law. The most important of these is consent. A state should
not apply a law unless the party burdened has consented to its applica-
tion (p. 210). This consent, however, need not be express; Brilmayer
would accept domicile or voluntary engagement in local conduct as a
sufficient expression of consent to allow a court to apply local law (p.
230). Another basis of legitimate state coercion is mutuality. By this,
Brilmayer means that a state should not hold a party to the burdens of
a rule "except in situations where it would help him or her if the tables
were turned" (p. 223). Brilmayer's example of a choice-of-law rule
that fails the mutuality test is one that requires the court to apply the
law of the state that is more advantageous to in-staters and disadvan-
tageous to out-of-staters (p. 223).
Rights-based analysis has several limitations, only some of which
Brilmayer acknowledges. First, as in interest analysis, rights-based
analysis will often point to more than one state whose law a court may
legitimately apply (p. 194). The problem of rights-based true conflicts
will thus arise. Brilmayer suggests that courts apply her rights-based
theory in conjunction with interest analysis. She would apparently
have the courts apply rights-based analysis as an initial screening de-
vice to eliminate inappropriate states' laws, and then apply interest
analysis to eliminate other states (p. 194). But even this method will
not eliminate all ambiguities in choice of law: the application of the
laws of more than one state may satisfy both theories.
Second, rights-based theory, like vested rights, is external and ob-
jective.17 That is, the rights granted by the theory, such as "the right
to be let alone," do not come from an internal lawmaking body of the
state, such as the state legislature. The legislature would probably like
to see its law applied to the greatest extent possible. The theory thus
faces the same objection as vested rights theory: Where do these exter-
nal norms come from, if not from positive law?
Brilmayer, of course, claims to be a positivist. She does not advo-
17. "[R]ights are supposed to be objective. The forum is entitled not merely to disagree with
other states on their concepts of rights but to conclude that other states are wrong." P. 205 n.39.
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cate a judge's ruling contrary to the positive law of the state. She
wants the judge to use her rights-based analysis only as a guide to fill
gaps in positive law, which are legion in conflicts cases (p. 205). Un-
like interest analysis, however, her theory does not purport to guide a
judge in ascertaining legislative intent.18 Rights-based analysis pro-
vides a separate normative guide to lawmaking. The theory thus
sounds something like the natural rights theories for which Beale was
roundly criticized. Brilmayer claims to adhere to positivism, but, as
she points out in Chapter One, so did Beale (pp. 18-19).
Regardless of these shortcomings, Brilmayer's rights-based theory
offers insights lacking in current theories. It provides a framework for
discussing fairness to the burdened party, which is excluded from in-
terest analysis. By excluding such considerations, interest analysis
may suffer the fate of vested rights under the First Restatement: it
may end up riddled with exceptions and escape devices that allow
judges to reach what they consider the just result in spite of the theory.
If Brilmayer does no more than enlarge the vocabulary of judges,
she may perform a valuable service. A judge who talks about fairness
to a burdened party is likely to be more restrained in his application of
local law than one who can speak only of state interests and policies.
This might indirectly create a climate of interstate cooperation, lead-
ing to greater reciprocity between states and a furthering of state inter-
ests. Rights-based analysis may in this way further the
consequentialist goals of interest analysis, even though the theory was
devised for a different purpose.
In the end, Brilmayer finds traditional interest analysis fundamen-
tally flawed because it lacks a notion of fairness to balance its preoccu-
pation with state interests and policies. Her perceptive criticisms of
the theory shed light on its limitations. Perhaps she believes she has
mortally wounded the theory. If such was her goal, she did not suc-
ceed; the beast has more life in it than she supposes. Her rights-based
analysis, however, is an important break with current theories and de-
serves the careful attention of conflicts scholars and judges. That
alone is a high achievement.
-Craig Y Allison
18. P. 47. Brilmayer would argue that interest analysts are being disingenuous when they
claim they are trying to ascertain legislative intent. P. 94. She believes that they, too, are impos-
ing objective, external standards on judges. P. 99.
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THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. By Welsh S. White.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 1991. Pp. 223. Cloth,
$34.50; paper, $17.95.
During the 1990-1991 Term, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ten-
nessee v. Payne ' that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a pros-
ecutor from arguing, nor a capital sentencing jury from considering,
victim impact evidence concerning the victim's personal characteris-
tics and the emotional impact of the murder on the victim's family.
During the same Term, in McCleskey v. Zant,2 the Court limited a
prisoner's right to file a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus if
the petition contains a claim presented for the first time.
While these cases are too recent to be included in Professor Welsh
S. White's book, The Death Penalty in the Nineties: An Examination
of the Modem System of Capital Punishment,3 they arguably reinforce
White's two major themes. First, White emphasizes the continuing
arbitrariness of the death penalty's application. He declares that
"[t]he death penalty is arbitrarily imposed if it is imposed on the basis
of factors that have no relationship to either the crime committed or
the character of the offender" (p. 157). Under this analysis, the Payne
decision, by allowing increased attention on the victim rather than on
the offender, appears to contribute to continuing arbitrariness. Sec-
ond, despite such arbitrariness, the Supreme Court is placing greater
priority on expeditious executions at the cost of a criminal defendant's
Eighth Amendment guarantee (pp. 8-23). Under White's rubric, the
Zant decision represents another step in this direction. 4
According to White, the arbitrary application of the death penalty
1. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
3. Welsh S. White is Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Professor White is the
author of THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYS-
TEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987) and LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
IN CAPITAL CASES (1984).
In the introduction to The Death Penalty in the Nineties, White notes that his latest book
differs from his earlier work, The Death Penalty in the Eighties; primarily due to the addition of
two chapters: one discussing the Supreme Court's monitoring of the capital punishment system
and the other discussing which convicted murderers are most likely to receive the death penalty.
P.1.
4. In arguing that the Supreme Court has placed a higher priority on the smooth function of
the capital punishment system than on protecting capital defendants' rights, White relies on
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). In Sykes; the Supreme Court limited a defendant's
ability to allege a constitutional claim in a federal habeas corpus petition when he has failed to
raise that same claim in the appropriate manner in the state courts. P. 16. In Zant, the Court
adopted the Sykes standard as the same standard limiting a defendant's ability to present a claim
for the first time in a second habeas corpus petition. Zant, 111 S. Ct. at 1470.
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continues today despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Furman v. Georgia5 and Gregg v. Georgia6 regarding the unconstitu-
tionality of arbitrary capital punishment procedures. As an example,
White points to the Baldus study that concluded the killer of a white
victim is more likely to receive the death penalty than the killer of a
nonwhite victim (p. 150). In McCleskey v. Kemp,7 the Supreme Court
stated that even though race might play a role in the criminal justice
system, racial discrepancies revealed in the Baldus study fall short of
the procedural defects identified in Furman (p. 158). Contrarily,
White argues that because the victim's race has nothing to do with the
nature of the crime or the character of the offender, taking such a
factor into account results in arbitrariness (p. 157). A victim's race
"has no more relevance to the nature of the crime or the character of
the offender than the color of the defendant's eyes or the day of the
week on which the crime was committed" (p. 157). One can surmise
from White's analysis that allowing a capital sentencing jury to con-
sider victim impact statements would result in arbitrariness as it
would focus the jury's attention on the victim rather than on the na-
ture of the crime or the character of the offender. Nonetheless, in
Payne, the Supreme Court stated that a victim impact statement in-
forms the sentencing authority of the harm caused by the convicted
defendant and that such harm is an appropriate factor in determining
punishment.8
Unfortunately, some of White's arguments supporting the death
penalty's continuing arbitrary application appear as masked attacks on
the entire criminal justice system. One may assume that the entire
criminal justice system is not perfect because it contains elements of
arbitrariness. It naturally follows that the death penalty will have
some of these unfortunate elements as well. Yet, White singles out the
arbitrariness of capital punishment as if it is the only worm in the
apple. For example, White asserts that court-appointed attorneys are
often inexperienced, and as a result the indigent defendant will more
5. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, struck down as
unconstitutional the then-existing capital punishment system. As each Justice issued an opinion,
there was no one opinion of the Court. Nonetheless, it has been commonly agreed that the
decisive ground of the Furman ruling "was that, out of a large number of persons 'eligible' in law
for the punishment of death, a few were selected as if at random, by no stated (or perhaps stat-
able) criteria, while all the rest suffered the lesser penalty of imprisonment." CHARLES BLACK,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 20 (1981).
6. The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976), read Furman as requiring
that the decision to impose the death penalty "be guided by standards so that the sentencing
authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant." Be-
cause Georgia's death penalty statute provided for a bifurcated proceeding in which the sentenc-
ing authority was provided with standards to guide its use of the information relevant to
imposing the sentence, the death penalty statute was upheld.
7. 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
8. 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2606 (1991).
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likely be sentenced to death.9 However, inexperienced court-ap-
pointed attorneys will increase the chances of a defendant being con-
victed of any crime. Perhaps the answer lies not with abolishing the
death penalty but with revising the system of court-appointed
attorneys.
White's discussion of plea bargaining provides another example of
a masked attack on the criminal justice system. White contends that a
prosecutor's willingness to enter into plea bargaining discussions in a
capital case is affected by factors unrelated to the nature of the crime
committed or the strength of the evidence against the defendant (p.
62). Instead, factors such as whether the prosecutor is seeking reelec-
tion, the location of the crime, and the funds available to the prosecu-
tor to prosecute the case influence the prosecutor's decision to extend
a plea bargain invitation to the capital defendant (p. 55). Yet, such
factors may influence a prosecutor's decision whether to plea bargain
in any criminal case. White also argues that, even if offered a plea
bargain, a defendant may reject it because he distrusts his attorney
who encourages acceptance of the offer or because the defendant be-
lieves a jury verdict will be more favorable than the plea bargain offer.
Thus, the ones who receive the death penalty are more likely to be less
culpable than the ones who plea bargain (p. 61). Accepting White's
assertion as valid, the same can be said for any defendant charged with
any crime who declines a plea bargain invitation. Thus, although
White's assertions may be evidence of the arbitrariness of the entire
criminal justice system, abolishing capital punishment will not resolve
these systemic problems. He could have responded as one commenta-
tor does by saying that even though the entire criminal justice system
may contain elements of arbitrariness, such arbitrary elements are
much more severe with capital punishment due to its permanence.10
White also does not raise and discuss an interesting premise pro-
9. P. 37. Considerable time and money is required for defense counsel to discover and pres-
ent mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase. Such presentation depends on the attor-
ney's ability to understand the dynamics of the death penalty trial. Pp. 76, 91.
10. See BLACK, supra note 5, at 39 (our legal system has accepted "the specialness of death
and the appropriateness of requiring, for death, more careful procedures than for any lesser
punishment"). Dr. Ernest van den Haag, a death penalty proponent, responds to Black by say-
ing: "In the application of any law some capriciousness is unavoidable. If this were to make
laws unconstitutional, we would have to do without laws, indeed, without the Constitution, for it
too is unavoidably applied capriciously." ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
DEBATE 206 (1983). Supreme Court justices have made similar observations:
Petitioner's argument that there is an unconstitutional amount of discretion in the system
which separates those suspects who receive the death penalty from those who receive life
imprisonment, a lesser penalty, or are acquitted or never charged, seems to be in final analy-
sis an indictment of our entire system ofjustice.... I decline to interfere with the manner in
which Georgia has chosen to enforce [the death penalty] on what is simply an assertion of
lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair manner.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225-26 (1976) (White, J., concurring); see also McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987) ("The Eighth Amendment is not limited in application to capi-
tal punishment, but applies to all penalties. Thus, if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial
bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with simi-
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posed by one death penalty proponent - Dr. Ernest van den Haag.
Van den Haag initially makes his point in a non-death penalty context.
He argues that selecting only bearded speeders for ticketing while al-
lowing the clean-shaven to escape is not unjust; what is unjust is the
escape of the clean-shaven. To restate it in a more relevant context:
"No murderer becomes less guilty, or less deserving of punishment,
because another murderer was punished leniently, or escaped punish-
ment altogether.... A group of murderers does not become less de-
serving of punishment because another equally guilty group is not
punished, or punished less." 1 Thus, the distribution of punishment is
offensive because some of those who deserved the death penalty did
not receive it, not because some who deserved it did receive it.
Perhaps one can argue van den Haag's assertion is not constitu-
tionally relevant. The Supreme Court seemed to say in Furman that
the death penalty is unconstitutionally administered when certain con-
victed defendants receive it as if by random chance.12 The constitu-
tional concern seems to be that of selective punishment: the courts
focus on why a convicted defendant was sentenced to death rather
than focus on why a convicted defendant was not sentenced to death.
Although van den Haag proposes an interesting philosophical argu-
ment, it may not exist as a constitutionally relevant inquiry because it
may ignore the ruling in Funnan. A book analyzing the death penalty
almost seems incomplete without raising this particular assertion by
van den Haag and then, perhaps, refuting it in a manner suggested
above.
In addition to arguing the death penalty's continuing arbitrary ap-
plication, White suggests that the Supreme Court is now more inter-
ested in the smooth functioning of the capital punishment system than
in protecting the rights of capital defendants (p. 207). He argues that
Lockhart v. McCree, 13 in which the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment does not prohibit prosecutors and defense attorneys from
asking prospective jurors about their attitudes toward the death pen-
alty during voir dire in capital cases, exemplifies the Court's new pri-
ority (p. 207). White cites studies that suggest a pro-death penalty
lar claims as to other types of penalty.") (citations omitted). But other commentators have taken
issue with this analysis:
[T]hough death is the most severe punishment in our legal system, it appears to be unneces-
sary for protecting citizens, while punishments generally are thought to promote our safety
and well-being .... Most of us believe that if all punishments were abolished, there would be
social chaos .... Hence, even though the system is not a just one, we believe that we must
live with it and strive to make it as fair as possible. On the other hand, if we abolish capital
punishment, there is reason to believe that nothing will happen.
Stephen Nathanson, Does It Matter if Death Penalty Is Arbitrarily Administered?, 14 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 149, 162 (1985).
11. Ernest van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165, 174
(1985).
12. See supra note 5.
13. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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jury will give less protection to a defendant during the guilt trial; for
example, a death-qualified jury (one in which no juror is opposed to
the death penalty on principle) may be more likely to convict a defend-
ant (pp. 191-92). Yet, as White states, because the Court is reluctant
to take action that would temporarily frustrate the operation of the
capital punishment system, the Court went out of its way to decide
that a death-qualified jury does not offend the Sixth Amendment (p.
207).
White discusses other recent Supreme Court cases to support his
contention that capital punishment jurisprudence is now engaged in
what he calls Phase II - a period begun in 1983 in which the Supreme
Court started promoting expeditious executions. 14 Phase I, by con-
trast, was the period from 1976 until 1983, in which the Court defined
protections for the defendant (p. 5). However, by declaring the exist-
ence of two distinct and perhaps somewhat divergent phases of
Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence, White does not seem to
have contemplated that perhaps Phase II is merely an extension of
Phase I. Expediting executions may promote a prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights. As one opponent of the death penalty has noted:
"It would be an obvious violation of the letter and the spirit of the
eighth amendment to keep prisoners under a sentence of death for
many years, even decades, with only the slightest probability that they
will ever be executed."15 This quotation suggests that White's conten-
tion that an emphasis on expediting executions results in a deemphasis
on a convicted murderer's constitutional rights (pp. 11, 21) may not
always be correct.
In addition to his two themes criticizing current death penalty ap-
plication, White discusses propositions and tactics of interest to practi-
tioners. Defense attorneys reading his book will find Chapter Four
particularly helpful, as it suggests death penalty trial strategies for
them. For example, White recommends provoking jury empathy for
14. P. 8. See eg., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494
U.S. 299 (1990). In Barefoot, the Supreme Court allowed appellate courts to adopt summary
procedures in death penalty cases such as deciding the merits of an appeal together with the
application for a stay. The Court declared that capital defendants do not have a right to use
habeas corpus to delay executions indefinitely. 463 U.S. at 887. The statute at issue in Blystone
stated that the capital sentencing jury must choose the death sentence if it finds at least one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. The defendant argued that the re-
quirement of individualized sentencing signifies that a jury must be allowed to determine whether
the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently serious to warrant the death penalty. The Court
stated that allowing the sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence satisfies the Eighth
Amendment's individualized sentencing requirement. 494 U.S. at 307. White says that "[t]he
tone of the Court's opinion exemplifies its present approach to capital punishment issues.
Although Blystone was a five-to-four decision, the majority made no effort to elaborate the basis
for its decision.... The majority's tone was curt, conclusory, and final." P. 13.
15. Victor L. Streib, Executions Under The Post-Capital Punishment Statutes: The Halting
Progression From "Let's Do It" to "Hey, There Ain't No Point In Pulling So Tight," 15 RUTGERS
L.J. 443, 487 (1984).
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the defendant and having the defendant express his remorse at mur-
dering human beings (p. 87). Unfortunately for prosecutors, he only
offers advice for the defense; nonetheless, a prosecutor can discover
what tactics a defense attorney might employ at a death penalty trial.
White's discussion is also presented from the defense side as he de-
votes much more analysis to the types of mitigating evidence a defense
attorney can present during the penalty trial (Chapter Five) than to
the types of aggravating evidence a prosecutor can present. White
notes that although a defendant has broad rights to present mitigating
evidence at a penalty trial, 16 the constitutional limits are not so clear
(p. 108). Because of the unclear constitutional restraints, he suggests
that states can limit the type of mitigating evidence the defendant can
present, such as preventing the disclosure of lie detector test results
and prohibiting arguments about the appropriateness of the death pen-
alty in general (pp. 108-09).
A prosecutor also may be unhappy with White's recommendation
that courts should impose a more rigorous restraint on a prosecutor's
closing argument at the death penalty trial than on a defense attor-
ney's closing argument (p. 113). White suggests courts should limit a
prosecutor to commenting on mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances in the case at hand and on how a jury is to weigh these circum-
stances; courts should prohibit a prosecutor from appealing to
emotions during the closing argument, such as arguments that arouse
a jury's fear of the defendant.1 7 A jury's weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, as required by statute, is to ensure that the
jury will condemn only those capital felons the legislature considered
the most heinous; a closing argument that diverts the jury's weighing
of such circumstances undermines the goal of obtaining an even-
handed application of the death penalty (p. 121). By contrast, a de-
fense attorney, whose role is to argue for mercy, should have more
leeway in arguing emotions to the jury. White predicts his suggestions
will lead to an objective determination and weighing of the circum-
stances by the jury (p. 120). A prosecutor can breathe a sigh of relief,
though, as White acknowledges that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
adopt his recommendations (p. 121).
White also presents an intriguing exploration of convicted defend-
ants who actually desire the death penalty (Chapter Eight). He gives
illustrations of convicted murderers who desire execution in order to
preserve their macho image (p. 177). Alarmingly, White proposes that
individuals might commit murder in the first instance in order to re-
16. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
17. Pp. 120-21. White bases these suggestions on his reading of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320 (1985). In Caldwell, the Court held it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment for a
prosecutor to tell the jury that its decision was automatically reviewable by the state supreme
court; this is because such a statement diminishes the jury's sense of responsibility and misleads a
jury into believing appellate review is less limited than it actually is.
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ceive the death penalty (pp. 178-79). Under such a scenario, the death
penalty may be a less effective deterrent than life in prison. He warns,
though, that a convicted murderer who says he prefers the death pen-
alty does not mean he preferred it before he committed the crime (p.
180); thus, there is no accurate way of determining the deterrence ef-
fect of capital punishment in such situations (p. 179). Nonetheless,
White's hypothesis that capital punishment is a less effective deterrent
in such circumstances is something death penalty proponents do not
consider. 18
By interviewing various defense attorneys, White reports tactics
that defense attorneys who are personally opposed to capital punish-
ment employ to change their clients' insistence on seeking the death
penalty. By developing a close rapport with a client, some defense
attorneys are able to change a client's mind (p. 166). White discusses
how one attorney, when faced with a client who insists on accepting
execution, persuades the client to change his decision by suggesting
the effect the execution will have on his family members (p. 166).
Shockingly, some defense attorneys will attempt to change a client's
mind by saying that confinement in the general prison population of-
fers a better chance for escape than on death row (p. 167). One attor-
ney tells alcoholic clients that alcohol can be obtained through illegal
sources in the general prison population but not on death row (p. 167).
Another attorney, who is also a law school professor, completely ig-
nores a client's wish to seek the death penalty; the client's wish is un-
important to the attorney because he believes that capital punishment
is immoral (p. 168). Even when a client tells the professor not to pres-
ent mitigating evidence or not to appeal a death penalty sentence, the
professor responds that the state law requires him to do so; yet, the
professor admits to White that the state law is unclear on these mat-
ters so his representations to his client may be incorrect (p. 168).
These stories are all appalling and require strong condemnation.
However, White does not explicitly criticize the attorneys who en-
courage their clients to break the law nor does he state that the proper
forum for the law school professor to express his personal opposition
to death penalty is the state legislature. White also neglects to men-
tion that the professor's questionable behavior unnecessarily clogs the
criminal justice system as the professor insists on adjudicating meas-
ures for his own pleasure rather than fulfilling his client's needs and
desires.
Although White quotes the relevant section of the ABA Code as
declaring that "the lawyer should always remember that the decision
whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of
18. P. 179. White notes that this proposition may undermine van den Haag's incessant advo-
cacy of the death penalty's deterrence factor. P. 179.
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non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself,"19
White states that the ethical guidelines do not specifically identify the
decision to seek the death penalty as one to which the defendant has
ultimate authority (p. 166). Eventually, White states that protecting a
capital defendant's individual autonomy is an important consideration
(p. 171). Thus, only implicitly and using the weakest possible lan-
guage does White disapprove of the attorneys' behavior he vividly de-
scribes. Such questionable defense counsel behavior deserves much
more analysis of potential violations of ethical (and even criminal)
codes. Otherwise, in the absence of strong condemnation of such
deplorable activity, defense attorneys reading such accounts may not
feel any remorse at trying such controversial techniques themselves.
Intriguing as White's analysis is of why defendants desire the death
penalty, other commentators also have suggested and analyzed this
phenomenon. 20 Additional themes that White discusses similarly have
been analyzed by other commentators.21 Rather than viewing The
Death Penalty in the Nineties as a book full of original, thought-pro-
voking ideas, one can view White's book as a collection of sources
illustrating the vices of the death penalty. White supplements his sum-
mary of the works of others with lively and descriptive case studies
which maintain the reader's attention, and he gives his own analysis of
some Supreme Court decisions 22 as well as recommendations on death
penalty trial tactics for defense attorneys (Chapter Four). At first
glance, White's book can be viewed as an introduction to the vices of
the death penalty; however, it lacks too many arguments and counter-
arguments to be considered a comprehensive work.
Most unfortunately, White's book lacks a solid conclusion. The
reader does not know what to do with White's assertions. One com-
mentator who argues, as does White, of the continuing arbitrariness of
the death penalty declares that, "'guided discretion' is not working
and, perhaps, cannot work. If this is correct and if the argument from
arbitrariness is accepted, then it would appear that a return from
Gregg to Furman is required. That is, the Court should once again
condemn capital punishment as unconstitutional. ' 23 The reader of
White's book can only infer such a conclusion. White's book would
19. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).
20. See eg., William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the
Effect of Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453 (1980).
21. White's theme of the Supreme Court's current emphasis on expediting executions has
been discussed by other commentators such as Streib, supra note 15, at 484. White's theme of
the death penalty's continuing arbitrary application has been discussed by other commentators
such as BLACK, supra note 5; William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimi-
nation under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980); Nathanson, supra
note 10.
22. In chapter 5, for example, White discusses his own interpretation of Supreme Court cases
as to what a defendant can present as mitigating evidence at the death penalty trial.
23. Nathanson, supra note 10, at 150.
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have a more powerful effect on the reader if White had linked all his
different assertions together to form one grand conclusion.
- Thomas L. Shaevsky
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